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It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboraory and /ry novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the coun/r. t
As Alexander Bickel predicted in 1970,' the doctrine of experimental
federalism 2 espoused by Justice Brandeis in New Slate Ice Co. v. Leibmann
3
is exhibiting new vigor throughout the American legal community. Ci-
tations to this famous dissent are no longer confined to U.S. Supreme
Court dissents, as they were during the Warren Court era. 4 Instead,
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t New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 116 (1970) ("There is
in being a reaction to the steady unification and nationalization of recent years, a movement
toward a decentralization and a diversity of which the as yet unacknowledged prophet-due,
I should suppose, for a revival-is Brandeis.").
2. This term is borrowed from Wilkinson,]ustireJohn M. Harlan and the Values of Federalism,
57 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (1971).
3. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
4. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (due process
should not require nationwide uniformity with respect to availability of jury trial in state
criminal proceedings); Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 752 (1964) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (states should be permitted to consider local factors, in addition to population,
in apportioning their legislatures). The second Justice Harlan, a consistent advocate of feder-
alist values in the Warren Court era, see Wilkinson, supra note 2; Bourguignon, The Second Mr.
Justice Harlan: His Principles ofjudwial Decron-Making, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 251, 252-53, often
paraphrased the above-reproduced passage from New Stale Ice without citing it. See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (states should
be accorded some "elbow room" in administering their criminal justice systems); Memoirs v.
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they have emerged in Burger Court majority opinions, 5 as well as in
concurrences and dissents. 6 Further, Brandeisian localism has been
brought to the attention of a growing number of lower federal 7 and state
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 460 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (states should be permitted
wider latitude than the federal government to experiment in regulation of obscenity); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (same).
For earlier citations to the New State Ice passage in the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Federal
Power Comm'n v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 488-89 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(Natural Gas Act not intended to preclude all state experimentation in utility regulation);
Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 96 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(courts should "indulge every reasonable presumption" in favor of state modifications of
property law governing oil and gas); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 296 (1947) (Jackson, J.)
(upholding use of "blue-ribbon" jury under policy of judicial self-restraint in imposing uni-
form criminal procedures on states).
5. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579 (1981) (Burger, C.J.) (Constitution does not
prohibit state from permitting broadcast coverage of criminal trials); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429,441 (1980) (Blackmun, J.) (upholding resident preference in sale of cement from
state-operated plant on grounds that contrary holding would, inter alia, "threaten the future
fashioning of effective and creative programs for solving local problems"); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 597 n.20 (1977) (Stevens, J.) (state may constitutionally require reporting to
state agency of identities of patients who have obtained prescriptions for dangerous drugs);
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (upholding Texas
system of school financing, analogizing challenged state-local funding scheme to "the Nation-
State relationship in our federal system").
6. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct.
1054, 1075 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (protesting extension of federal Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act to state and local governments on ground that "[n]othing in the
Constitution permits Congress to force the states into a Procrustean national mold that takes
no account of local needs and conditions"); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 77 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (state cannot discriminate based on length of
residency in distribution of state funds because "[j]ust as our federal system permits the States
to experiment with different social and economic programs . . . it allows the individual to
settle in the State offering those programs best tailored to his or her tastes"); Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 n.20 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring
and dissenting) (federal requirements that state agencies "spend their time evaluating feder-
ally proposed standards" will retard "creative experimentation" by states in utility regula-
tion); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (local governments will be "unable to experiment with innovative
social programs" if their actions are subjected to antitrust scrutiny under the Sherman Act);
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 439 n.27 (1978) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (same); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 616 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(observing that Court's overturning of state'statute requiring criminal defendants to testify
before other defense witnesses "erodes the important policy of allowing diversity of method
and procedure to the States"); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (commenting on importance of state experimentation in criminal procedure in
connection with decision upholding less than unanimous jury provision).
7. See, e.g., MeMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. deni'd, 455 U.S. 967
(1982) (state's reasonable assertion that court-made evidentiary rule requiring stipulation to
admissibility of polygraph test results is justified because stipulation enhances the reliability
of the test not to be questioned, citing value of experimentation); Vruno v. Schwarzenwalder,
600 F.2d 124, 131 & n. 10 (8th Cir. 1979) (state statute establishing standards and procedures
to be followed when criminal offenders seek public employment designed to encourage reha-
bilitation "reflects the type of social experimentation reserved to the states by the Constitu-
tion"); New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388, 393, 395 (2d Cir.
1977), aft'd, 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (Congressional intent to avoid excessive intrusion into local
affairs consistent with New Deal era belief in experimental federalism); Standard Oil Co. of
California v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1977), af'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.
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appellate courts.8 Growing judicial interest has been mirrored by an
increasing scholarly attention to "the still exciting idea . that states
are laboratories for experimentation." 9
The New State Ice dissent is currently regarded as a relevant precedent
in a number of federal constitutional contexts.l 0 That is, the dissenting
opinion is widely and, this article argues, correctly perceived both as
(1) a rational judicial solution to the particular set of facts and issues
before the New State Ice court and (2) a legal development which
promises to contribute significantly to a just future. Therefore, Brandei-
sian experimental federalism deserves the careful historical explication
required to identify precisely what the author of the dissent meant when
he wrote those oft-quoted words. Much has been written about Bran-
deis,'I yet no work has focused squarely or accurately on the political
1980), aft'd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981) (Congress admonished for preempting state laws without
discussion of the states' relative ability to provide protection), Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415
F. Supp. 485, 502 (D. Mass. 1976), vacated sub. noma. Massachusetts v. Feeny, 434 U.S. 884
(1977) (Murray, J., concurring and dissenting) (the principle of federalism is a recognition of
the value of state experimentation).
8. See, e.g., Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422, 447 (Alaska 1980), aft'd, 457 U.S. 55 (1982)
(Connor, J., dissenting) (questions of broad tax policy should be left to tne state legislature);
Cuciak v. State, 394 So. 2d 500, 505 (Fla. App. 1981) (Hurley, J., concurring) (progressive
state policy should not be abandoned just because another state's policy differs); State v.
Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 120, 363 A.2d 321, 339-40 (1976) (value of experimentation supports
modification, rather than elimination, ofjudicially created program); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-
Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (1978) (princi-
ples of federalism support construction of state due process clause independent of construction
of United States Constitution).
9. Newman, The "Old Federalism" Protection of Individual Rights by State Constitutions in an Era
of Federal Court Passivity, 15 CONN. L. REV. 21, 23 n.10 (1982). See also Collins, Reliance on State
Constitutions.- Away from a Reactionay , Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 7-8 (1981); Thomp-
son, Electronic Media in the Courtroom: Some Observations on Federalism and State Experimentation, 9
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 349 (1982); but see, Rose-Ackerman, Risk- Taking and Reflction: Does Federal-
ism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (arguing that pressures of electoral poli-
tics inhibit political experimentation.).
A classic statement of the doctrine is found in Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 493 (1954). Hart was Brandeis' law clerk when New State Ice
was decided.
10. The term "relevant precedent," as used here, was developed in Deutsch, Precedent and
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553, 1584 (1974). See also infra text accompanying notes 176-77.
11. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957);
N. DAWSON, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND THE NEW DEAL (1980); T.
FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE Swift AND Erie CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERAL-
ISM 88-89, 120, 130-53 (1981); A. GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON (1980); H. HIRSCH, THE
ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 104-06 (1981); P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 19-21
(1982); LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1971-1978) [hereinafter
cited as LETTERS]; A. LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL
(1936); A. MARTIN, ENTERPRISE DENIED: ORIGINS OF THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN RAIL-
ROADS, 1897-1917, 160-62, 197-218 (1971) (a study which is quite critical of Brandeis' public
utility economics); A. MASON, BRANDEIS: LAWYER AND JUDGE IN THE MODERN STATE,
(1933) [hereinafter cited as A. MASON (I)]; A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE
(1946) [hereinafter cited as A. MASON (II)]; B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER
CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF Two SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
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and ideological sources of his well-known commitment to constitution-
ally unfettered local self-government. 12 Schlesinger 3 and Laski' 4 have
depicted (and dismissed) Brandeisian localism as mere twentieth-cen-
tury Jeffersonianism, but the truth is rather more complex and certainly
more interesting.
The first and most basic source of Brandeis' experimental federalism
(and the New State Ice dissent particularly) was the Progressive Republi-
canism practiced by two generations of LaFollettes in Wisconsin. Bran-
deis' noted reluctance to employ the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to invalidate state legislation cannot properly be under-
stood without knowledge of his advocacy of the "Wisconsin Idea"-a
political ideal which assumed that the states, rather than the federal
government, were the preferred political fora.
Brandeis is known to have been a Progressive. However, it is not gen-
erally known that Progressivism was a trans-Atlantic phenomenon.
Long before Teddy Roosevelt's New Nationalists and the advocates of
Wilson's New Freedom battled for control of American reform politics
in the 1912 presidential election, Unionist (Tory) Tariff Reformers and
the "Progressive Alliance" led by Asquith and Lloyd George offered
similarly opposed reform programs to the British electorate.15 Although
(1982); M. UROFSKY, A MIND Of ONE PIECE: BRANDEIS AND AMERICAN REFORM (1971)
[hereinafter cited as UROFSKY (I)]; M. UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRES-
SIVE TRADITION (1981) [hereinafter cited as UROFSKY (II)]; Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis.- A
Centennial Memoir, 70 HARv. L. REV. 769 (1957); Freund, Mr. JustiCe Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE
97 (A. Dunham & P. Kurland eds. 1945); Lerner, The Social Thought of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 41
YALE L.J. 1 (1931); Rabban, The Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
1205, 1320-44 (1983); Note, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Competition and Smallness., A Dilemna Re-ex-
amined, 66 YALE L.J. 619 (1956); Cover, Book Review, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1982, at
17; Danielski, Book Review, 96 HARv. L. REV. 312 (1982).
12. Lerner, supra note 11, and A. MASON (I), supra note 11, come nearest to accuracy in
this matter. Accuracy, however, is impossible until one discards the New Deal-treated lenses
through which Brandeis is usually viewed.
13. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLDER ORDER,
1919-1933 28-33 (1957); A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF
UPHEAVAL 220, 235-38 (1960); compare F. RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955, 228 (1955) ("Brandeis' somewhat nineteenth-
century scheme of things").
14. 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1448 (M. Howe ed. 1953) (Laski, writing in 1933 of Bran-
deis: "[H]e is really a Jeffersonian Democrat .... I take him to be intellectually . . . a
romantic anachronism").
15. See, Keller, Anglo-Amertan Politics, 1900-1930, in Anglo-American Perspective." A Case Study
in Comparative Histor, 22 COMp. STUD. Soc'y & HIST. 458, 476-77 (1980) (characterizing the
British and American political experience of the period as a "rare and distinctive historical
convergence"); Morgan, The Future at Work.- Antglo-American Progressivism 1890-1917, in CON-
TRAST AND CONNECTION: BICENTENNIAL ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN HISTORY 245 (H.
Allen & R. Thompson eds. 1976); Rodgers, In Search ofProgressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST., Dec.
1982, at 113, 125-26 n.54 (1982); Steiner, The Legal Profession in the Progressive Era.- Locahm and
Legal Education in the Sixth Circuit States, 1890-1925, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 759, 780 n. 100 (1983).
For recent works treating the British Progressive Alliance, see P. CLARKE, LANCASHIRE
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the Progressive Alliance, a grouping of "advanced" Liberal intellectuals
and Liberal-Labour trade unionists, disintegrated during World War
1,16 British Progressives were nevertheless able to refurbish Liberal polit-
ical ideology in the 1920's.
This trans-Atlantic Progressive impulse provided a second source for
Brandeis' experimental federalism. Brandeis borrowed the concept of
social invention from Graham Wallas, a British Progressive intellectual,
to describe political response to socio-economic change. Brandeis also
owed a significant intellectual debt to the 1928 Liberal Party "Yellow
Book" on industrial policy, a Progressive tract written in part by John
Maynard Keynes.
A third, more abstract and more important source of Brandeisian ex-
perimental federalism was a strand in American political culture-Aris-
totelian in origin-which cannot be ignored nor fitted within or reduced
to the contemporary liberal constitutional theorist's paradigm of funda-
mental rights and judicially-ordered "structural remedies." Brandeis
did not predicate his federalism on a supposed constitutional right to
local self-government. Rather, Brandeis' federalism followed from a vi-
sion of politics as creative activity, of politics as active participation by
individual citizens in ruling and being ruled. 17 For Brandeis, federalism
AND THE NEW LIBERALISM (1971); S. COLLINI, LIBERALISM AND SOCIOLOGY: L.T.
HOBHOUSE AND POLITICAL ARGUMENT IN ENGLAND, 1880-1914, 98-99 (1979); M. FREEDEN,
THE NEW LIBERALISM: AN IDEOLOGY OF SOCIAL REFORM (1978); B. MURRAY, THE PEO-
PLE'S BUDGET 1909-10: LLOYD GEORGE AND LIBERAL POLITICS (1980); Clarke, The Progres-
sive Movement in England, 24 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC'Y 159 (5th ser. 1974); Petter,
The Progressive Alliance, 58 HIST. (n.2.) 45 (1973).
On the Tariff Reform campaign, see G. PHILLIPS, THE DIEHARDS: ARISTOCRATIC SOCI-
ETY AND POLITICS IN EDWARDIAN ENGLAND, 103-08, 118-26 (1979); G. SEARLE, THE QUEST
FOR NATIONAL EFFICIENCY: A STUDY IN BRITISH POLITICS AND POLITICAL THOUGHT,
1899-1914, 145-57 (1971); A. SYKES, TARIFF REFORM IN BRITISH POLITICS, 1903-1913
(1979); Dutton, The Unionist Party and Social Policy, 1906-1914, 24 HIST. J. 871 (1981).
Other useful works on British politics of the period include D. CREGIER, BOUNDER FROM
WALES: LLOYD GEORGE'S CAREER BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1976); J. HARRIS,
WILLIAM BEVERIDGE: A BIOGRAPHY (1977); R. JAY, JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN: A POLITICAL
STUDY (1981); D. MARQUAND, RAMSAY MACDONALD (1977); K. MORGAN & J. MORGAN,
PORTRAIT OF A PROGRESSIVE: THE POLITICAL CAREER OF CHRISTOPHER, VISCOUNT AD-
DISON (1980); M. WIENER, BETWEEN Two WORLDS: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF GRA-
HAM WALLAS (1971).
16. See M. COWLING, THE IMPACT OF LABOUR, 1920-1924: THE BEGINNING OF MOD-
ERN BRITISH POLITICS (1971); K. MORGAN, CONSENSUS AND DISUNITY: THE LLOYD
GEORGE COALITION GOVERNMENT, 1918-1922 (1979); J. TURNER, LLOYD GEORGE'S SEC-
RETARIAT (1980). Set also, Petter, supra note 15, at 51 (stessing the "inability [of the Progres-
sive Alliance] to tackle at its source that traditional conflict which arose whenever Labour's
desire for continued expansion came up against the Liberal party organization's instincts for
self-preservation").
17. For an inquiry into the nature of the "active citizenry," as distinct from the "funda-
mental rights" model of politics, see Pocock, Virtues, Rights and Manners: A Modelfor Historians
of Political Thought, 9 POL. THEORY 353 (1981); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); see
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was important because it was only at the state and local levels of govern-
ment that most Americans could participate in creative political activ-
ity. In short, federalism provided the essential context for Brandeis'
conception of what might be termed civic individualism. 8 It is this
political theoretical aspect of Brandeis' experimental federalism that
makes a significant contribution to a just future and therefore estab-
lishes the New State Ice dissent as a precedent relevant to the 1980's and
beyond.
I. The New State Ice Case
When the New State Ice Company filed a complaint against Ernest
A. Liebmann in Oklahoma City's federal district court in March,
1930,19 that city had not felt the Great Depression's full force. In fact,
the local economy was expanding in 1930, largely on the strength of
construction activity and recent oil and gas discoveries. 20 Oklahoma's
capital city seemed well positioned to endure hard times.
2
1
The gist of the New State Ice Company complaint was that Lieb-
mann, an ice merchant who was active in other Southwest markets, in-
tended to exploit Oklahoma City's buoyant economy by erecting an ice
plant without first going through proper state regulatory channels. In
other words, New State Ice complained that Liebmann failed to procure
the certificate of convenience and necessity a 1925 Oklahoma statute
required him to obtain prior to beginning construction work on his ice
plant in February, 1930.22 Accordingly, the New State Ice Company,
which possessed such a certificate, asked the federal district court "per-
petually [to] enjoin . . .and restrain . . .[Liebmann] from the manu-
facture, sale and distribution of ice within Oklahoma City without first
having obtained a license or permit . . .23
Why New State Ice, a Delaware corporation doing business in
also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value. National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981
SUP. CT. REV. 81.
18. "Civic individualism" is discussed in detail in R. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
RIGHTS (1976). See infia text accompanying notes 225-231.
19. Record at 1, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) [hereinafter cited as
"Record"].
20. See R. STEWART, BORN GROWN: AN OKLAHOMA CITY HISTORY, 149-50, 203, 212-
15, 233 (1974).
21. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 42 F.2d 913, 918 (W.D. Okla. 1930) (describing
Oklahoma City as a "young, industrious, wide-awake growing city"). The appearance of
economic stability was, of course, short-lived. See J. STEINBECK, GRAPES OF WRATH (1939)
(plight of "Okies" during the Great Depression); see also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
167-68 (1941).
22. Record at 2-3.
23. Id at 3.
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Oklahoma, and the Southwest Utility Ice Company, 24 an Oklahoma
corporation which filed an essentially similar action, chose a federal fo-
rum is not clear. Not diversity actions, the suits were framed by counsel
as equity actions "arising under and involving the construction and ap-
plication of the Constitution of the United States."'2 5 However, the
complainants only sought enforcement of a state regulatory statute.
The statute in question, while apparently the first of its kind in the
nation, did no more than apply standard regulatory technology in a new
context, the ice industry. In relevant part, the statute provided:
§ 1. That the manufacture, sale and distribution of ice. . . is hereby de-
clared to be a public business, as defined by Section 11032 of the Compiled
Statutes of Oklahoma.
§ 2. That no person. . . shall be permitted to manufacture, sell and dis-
tribute ice within the State of Oklahoma without having first secured a
license for such purpose from the Corporation Commission of the State of
Oklahoma.
§ 3. That the Corporation Commission shall not issue a license to any
person . ..except upon a hearing . . . at which said hearing competent
testimony and proof shall be presented showing the necessity for the manu-
facture, sale or distribution of ice . ..at the point, community or place
desired.
26
Violations of this statute were misdemeanors punishable by fines.
2 7
Liebmann's defense to the two injunctive suits was straightforward.
His attorneys first "specifically denie[d]" that the ice business was "in
fact a public business and that the properties used therein [were] public
utilities."'2 8 Attempts to enforce the Oklahoma ice legislation, which
hinged on the state legislature's classification of ice manufacture and
distribution as a "public business," were therefore wrongful, amounting
to a violation of "rights guaranteed . . .and protected under and by
virtue of the Constitution of the United States."'2 9 The ice statute par-
24. Ice manufacture, sale and distribution was a common (and apparently profitable)
sideline for Oklahoma's electric utilities. Se R. STEWART, supra note 20, at 151 (manufacture
of ice in Oklahoma City by Oklahoma Gas & Electric); Record at 34, 36 (public service
corporations owned one third of the city's ice plants and operated them in connection with
their public utility business).
25. Record at 1.
26. 1925 Okla. Sess. Laws 226-28 (1925); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 52 F.2d 349,
350-51 n.1 (10th Cir. 1931). This ice regulation bill was intended, whatever its ultimate ef-
fects, to curb abuses in the sale of ice, especially the purveying of short-weighted or unclean
ice by itinerant seasonal vendors and price discrimination; see Record at 25-26, 32-35, 39-40.
27. Each day's violation of the statute constituted a separate offense for which a twenty-
five dollar ($25.00) fine could be assessed. In addition, the Corporation Commission was
empowered to promulgate general orders, violations of which was punishable by a five hun-
dred dollar ($500.00) fine. 1925 Okla. Sess. Laws 227-28 (1925).
28. Record at 6.
29. Id at 7.
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ticularly impinged, Liebmann's counsel continued, on Liebmann's
rights under the contract clause of the federal Constitution and the four-
teenth amendment.
While Liebmann's attorneys also questioned New State Ice's standing
to sue as an alleged non-participant in the Oklahoma City ice busi-
ness, 30 Liebmann was, in a sense, fortunate that the trial court disre-
garded this argument and proceeded to the merits of the case. Federal
district Judge Pollock3 ' looked upon the New State Ice and Southwest
Utility Ice suits, which he had consolidated for trial, as primarily in-
tended to "further [the complainants'] practical monopoly of the
[Oklahoma City] ice business."'32 Pollock believed that the actions had
been brought only because New State Ice Company and Southwest
Utility Ice "did not invite and do not welcome . . .competition . . .
whether the same be beneficial to purchasers of ice dealing with them or
not."' 33 Judge Pollock also wrote that the 1925 Oklahoma ice statute
"tend[ed] of necessity to the creation and perpetuation of monopolies
and to the destruction of all competition.
'34
Guided by the arguments of Liebmann's trial attorney, former
Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice George M. Nicholson, 35 the trial
court first held that, as a matter of state law, the ice business was not a
"public business" as defined by the general regulatory statute, § 11032,
notwithstanding the explicit declaration in the 1925 ice statute. 36 Judge
Pollock found that Nicholson's Oklahoma Supreme Court had so lim-
ited the reach of state regulation through interpretation of § 11032 as to
preclude the application of statutory regulation to the state's ice
business.
37
Alternatively, in the trial court's judgment, the 1925 ice statute failed
to survive federal constitutional analysis. Using the then-recent U.S.
Supreme Court cases of WofftPacking Co. v. Industrial Court38 and Tson &
Bros. v. Banton39 as touchstones, Judge Pollock argued that there were
30. Id. at 8.
31. John C. Pollock (1857-1937), A.B. Franklin College, 1882; private study of law, St.
Clairsville, Ohio, 1882-84; private practice, Wingfield, Kansas, 1888-1901; Justice, Kansas
Supreme Court, 1901-02; Judge, Federal District of Kansas, 1903-37. It is not clear why
Pollock, rather than one of the Oklahoma federal district judges, heard the case.
32. 42 F.2d at 914.
33. Id
34. Id
35. George M. Nicholson had been elected to the state high court in November, 1920 and
served from January 10, 1921 (see 80 Okla. iii) to January 10, 1927 (see 123 Okla. iii).
36. 42 F.2d at 915-16.
37. Id at 916.
38. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
39. 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
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federal constitutional limits, embedded primarily in the fourteenth
amendment, to the enterprises states could legitimately regulate as pub-
lic utilities.40 Ice manufacture and distribution was not a regulable en-
terprise. Therefore, the court ruled for defendant Liebmann, dismissing
the complaints as without equity.4' Judge Pollock's opinion is murky,
but it seems to invalidate the 1925 Oklahoma ice statute.
The established ice companies appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 4 2 per Circuit Judge Orie L. Phillips, 43 noted that appellants
had failed either to plead or to prove possession of Oklahoma ice licenses
valid after June 1930, the date of the opinion below. In the panel's
opinion, that fact "alone would justify an affirmance of the decree
below."
4 4
Notwithstanding the availability of this legal "out", the appellate tri-
bunal proceeded to the case's merits. The court framed the sole issue on
appeal as follows:
Is the business of manufacturing and selling ice of such a character that it
is subject to regulation to the extent of requiring a certificate of conven-
ience and necessity before a person may engage in such business? Or, to
put it another way, may the state prohibit one man from manufacturing
ice on his own property and selling it to his neighbor at a price they mutu-
ally agree upon?
45
In answering these questions, the appellate tribunal dealt exclusively
with federal constitutional law: the minutiae of Oklahoma public util-
ity law which had in part occupied Judge Pollock's time were ignored.
General federal constitutional principles had pride of place. The Tenth
Circuit panel postulated that freedom with respect to entry into (and
maintenance of) occupations and businesses was the general American
rule, and restraint the exception. 46 Extensive regulation was justified
only in the case of businesses legally "affected with a public interest. '47
Judge Phillips then invoked Wo0, 48 a unanimous decision of the early
40. 42 F.2d at 916-17.
41. Id at 918.
42. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges John H. Cotteral (1864-1933) of Guthrie,
Oklahoma, George T. McDermott (1886-1937) of Topeka, Kansas, and Orie L. Phillips.
43. Orie L. Phillips (1885-1974), attended Knox College, 1903-04; J.D. U. Mich. 1908,
LL.D. U. Mich. 1935; private practice, New Mexico, 1910-23; state district attorney, 1912-16;
GOP majority leader, New Mexico Senate, 1920-23; Judge, federal District of New Mexico,
1923-29; Judge, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1929-1974; Chief Judge, Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 1940-1955. See 516 F.2d 5 (1975) (posthumous tribute to Judge Phillips).
44. 52 F.2d at 351.
45. Id
46. Id at 351-52.
47. Id at 352, quoting Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 240 (1928).
48. Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (Taft, C.J.),rev'g 111 Kan.
501, 207 P. 806 (1922). See also Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 267 U.S. 552 (1925),
rev'g 114 Kan. 304, 219 P. 259 (1923).
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Taft Court, for its tripartite classification of businesses "affected with a
public interest." '49 The first category of regulable businesses under Wo'ff
consisted of enterprises "carried on under the authority of a public grant
of privileges which either expressly or impliedly impose[d] the affirma-
tive duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of the
public."'50 The second category was comprised of "[c]ertain occupa-
tions, regarded as exceptional, the public interest attaching to which
. . .has survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or colonial
Legislatures for regulating all trades and callings." 5' The court was cer-
tain that Liebmann's projected ice business was not covered by either of
these first two Wo'l categories.
52
Whether or not it was encompassed by the third Wo4f category of
businesses "affected with a public interest" was a closer question. This
last group included "businesses which, though not public at their incep-
tion, may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become sub-
ject in consequence to some government regulation." Such businesses
"have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this is
superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases, the owner [of a
third Wolff category enterprise], by devoting [it] to the public use, in
effect grants the public [a legal] interest in that use and subjects himself
to public regulation to the extent of that interest."
'53
Third-category businesses generally provided indispensable services to
consumers who, absent government regulation, would theoretically be
exposed to the threat of exorbitant charges by monopoly vendors.
54
Given this pattern, the court found that the Oklahoma ice business
probably lay outside the third Wof category. 55 Not only were electric
home refrigerators rapidly making market ice sales less and less of an
indispensable service, but it was also a fact that ice prices in non-regu-
lated states were lower, for the most part, than in regulated
Oklahoma.
56
Moreover, even if the "public interest" in Oklahoma extended to the
ice business-which the court doubted-it did not extend so far as to
justify the exclusion of would-be ice entrepreneurs from available mar-
kets through use of a mandatory licensing scheme.57 "[A] limitiation on
49. 52 F.2d at 352.




54. Id at 354.
55. Id at 355.
56. Id (table showing average ice prices in regulated and non-regulated states).
57. Id. at 354.
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the right to engage in a business which is a matter of common right is an
even greater encroachment on the rights of the citizen than the regula-
tion of prices in such business." 58 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit reluc-
tantly upheld the 1925 Oklahoma statute insofar as it permitted price
regulation, but overturned it insofar as it required prior licensing of
those who desired to engage in the ice business. In so doing, the appel-
late panel followed a recent opinion by the Arkansas Supreme Court, an
opinion which had invalidated the entry licensing provisions of an Ar-
kansas statute regulating the ice business.
59
New State Ice Company-this time alone--appealed from the
Tenth Circuit to the U.S. Supreme Court, relying on 28 U.S.C.
§ 347(b). 61 New State Ice asserted that two errors had been made by
the appellate court: (1) it erred in holding the 1925 Oklahoma ice stat-
ute unconstitutional in part; and (2) it erred in affirming the district
court's dismissal of the equitable suits against Liebmann.
62
The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the statute. 63 Justice Suther-
land delivered the Court's opinion on March 21, 1932. Sutherland
agreed with trial court Judge Pollock's assertion that the 1925 ice statute
could lead to nothing but monopoly. 64 Further, he agreed with the
Tenth Circuit panel's ruling that "a regulation which has the effect of
denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a




59. Id., cting Cap. F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin Utilities Co., 180 Ark. 770, 22 S.W.2d
993 (1929). The Tenth Circuit's reliance on this decision was not entirely well-founded. The
Arkansas high court's decision in Bourland was bottomed on a state constitutional provision-
for which there was no Oklahoma or federal equivalent-prohibiting the granting or creation
of monopolies. 180 Ark. at 774, 22 S.W.2d at 994-95. Justice Brandeis later referred to the
Arkansas statute and the Bourland decision in his New State Ice dissent. 285 U.S. at 283 n.4
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
60. However, Southwest Utility Ice's counsel was listed as "Of Counsel" on New State
Ice's legal papers. Appellant's Statement of Basis for Appeal at 9, New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
61. The contemporary statutory counterpart is 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1976) (allowing ap-
peal of federal question by party relying on state statute held unconstitutional by court of
appeals).
62. See Appellant's Brief at 32, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
63. This was the third time in twelve years that the Supreme Court invalidated
Oklahoma public-utility legislation. See Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331
(1920) (Brandeis, J.); Oklahoma Gin Co. v. Oklahoma, 252 U.S. 339 (1920) (Brandeis, J.)
(holding predecessor to § 11032 unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment for failure
to provide adequate judicial review of Oklahoma Corporation Commission determinations);
Frost v. Corp. Comm'n., 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (holding regulation of cotton ginning enterprises
violative of fourteenth amendment); see also id., 278 U.S. 528 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
64. 285 U.S. at 278-79.
65. Id at 278.
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In the critical passage of his opinion, Sutherland found Oklahoma ice
enterprises to be no more than "lawful private business[es]. ' ' 66 The tri-
partite classificatory scheme of Wolft lay just beneath the surface of the
opinion. The majority opinion, like that of the Tenth Circuit, focused
on whether or not ice enterprises lay within the ambit of the third Woff
category. If they did not, then the Oklahoma legislature's classification
was erroneous and the 1925 statute was unconstitutional.
Sutherland gave content to the third Woff category of businesses le-
gally "affected with a public interest" by discussing his opinion in Frost v.
Corporation Commisst'on,67 in which the Court assumed that Oklahoma's
cotton ginning industry fell within the third Wolf classification. Citing
to a subsequent Tenth Circuit decision which directly addressed the
question,68 Sutherland explained and confirmed the Frost assumption.
The production of cotton is the chief industry of. . .Oklahoma, and is of
such paramount importance as to justify the assertion that the general wel-
fare and prosperity of the state in a very large and real sense depend upon
its maintenance. . . . The relation between the growers of cotton, who
constitute a very large proportion of the population, and those engaged in
furnishing the [cotton-ginning] service, is thus seen to be a peculiarly close
one in respect of an industry of vital concern to the general public. These
considerations render it not unreasonable to conclude that the [cotton]
business "has been devoted to a public use and its use thereby, in effect,
granted to the public."
'69
By comparison, the Oklahoma ice business displayed none of these
indicia. Ice manufacture, sale and distribution, while perhaps impor-
tant to civilized life in parched, sweltering Oklahoma, was but "an ordi-
nary business, not. . . a paramount industry upon which the prosperity
of the entire state . . .depend[ed]. '70 It was an "essentially private"
undertaking: it bore "no such relation to the public as to warrant its
inclusion in the [third Wo'lf] category of businesses charged with public
use." 7' Therefore, the legislation regulating the ice industry was void.
72
Sutherland concluded with an attack on the experimental federalism
Brandeis advocated in his New State Ice dissent, writing that "it is plain
that unreasonable or arbitrary interference or restrictions cannot be
saved from the condemnation of [the Fourteenth] Amendment merely
by calling them experimental. . . . [T]here are certain essentials of lib-
66. Id
67. 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
68. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Cotton County Gin Co., 40 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1930).
69. 285 U.S. at 276-77.
70. Id at 277.
71. Id
72. Id. at 278-80.
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erty with which the state is not entitled to dispense in the interest of
experiments.
'73
II. Brandeis and American Progressivism
It is puzzling that "the classic conception of states as laboratories
'74
seems to appear first in a dissenting opinion which seems merely to ad-
vocate the maintenance of regulated public service monopolies in
Oklahoma. 75 The short explanation for this is that Brandeis was pri-
marily concerned at the time of New Stale Ice with the legal fate of La-
Follette Progressive Republicanism's most recent "political
invention"-the unemployment insurance reserves scheme Wisconsin
had enacted two months earlier, in January of 1932.76 Bruce Murphy
has recently noted that this unemployment insurance reserves program
was so "important . . . to the Justice that he . . . devoted much of his
public life to seeking its adoption. ' 77 Murphy's comment applies not
only to Brandeis' public life, but also to the enunciation of one of the
Justice's most enduring ideas.
A. The Received Brandeis
Many American historians, and not a few practicing attorneys, could
sketch Justice Brandeis' biography. A Louisville, Kentucky native,
Brandeis attended Harvard Law School. After graduation, he became a
successful corporate attorney in Boston who also used his legal expertise
in the service of what he perceived to be the public interest. In the
73. Id at 279-80. Accord Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring) (attacking experimental federalism in similar language); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (same); Gilliard v. Mississippi, - U.S. -, 104
S. Ct. 40, 41-42 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Court should not
make use of the experimental federalism metaphor to shrink from its duty of review); Israel,
Selective Incorporation.- Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 321-25 (1982).
It is important to note that jurists who have opposed experimental federalism have often
been motivated by political (and political-theoretical) concerns. Sutherland's New State Ice
volley recalls words he spoke, as a GOP Stalwart, during the days of LaFollette's Progressive
Republican Insurgency (1911-1912). See G. SUTHERLAND, GOVERNMENT BY BALLOT 6, 7, 9,
13, 34 (1911) (Sutherland's speech, as a U.S. Senator from Utah, criticizing the "experimen-
tal" state constitutions of New Mexico and Arizona prior to their admission to the Union and
Progressive Republicanism generally).The politics of Justices Marshall and Goldberg are
clearly not those of Justice Sutherland, but they too may have motivated the later justices'
aversion to "experimental federalism," at least in those federal constitutional preserves
deemed to be above or immune from state political experimentation.
74. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1075 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
75. See A. MASON (II),supra note 11, at 609; Freund, A Centennia7l Memoir, supra note 11, at
785-86.
76. See D. NELSON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 1915-
1935 (1969).
77. See B. MURPHY, supra note 11, at 94-95.
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latter, "People's Attorney" role, Brandeis sought to obtain labor-man-
agement accord on the necessity of stable employment, decent wages
and safe working conditions. He worked to break up public-utility and
industrial trusts, believing that small economic units were nearly as effi-
cient as larger entities. In a successful attempt to protect social-reform
legislative gains in litigation, he wrote the first "Brandeis brief," a
lengthy court pleading replete with sociological and economic data as
well as (and sometimes in place of) traditional legal authorities. An ar-
dent believer in political decentralization, Brandeis was appointed to
the U.S. Supreme Court by the essentially Jeffersonian President Wilson
and enjoyed perhaps his greatest influence in American government in
the mid-1930's, when Franklin D. Roosevelt's Second New Deal in-
cluded several neo-Brandeisian features.78
One of the major defects of Brandeis historiography is its domination
by an embellished or slightly modified version of this sketch. Oversim-
plification shades insensibly into distortion when historians, assuming
that Brandeis was a life-long partisan Democrat, 79 interpret his localism
as a latter-day Jeffersonianism.80 Remarks made by commentators in
the 1930's, when Brandeis was (at least theoretically) able to respond to
misleading summations or characterizations of his thought,8 ' have but-
tressed this view, making it the received wisdom on the topic.
82
B. Brandeis as a Jersonan
One can chip away at this orthodoxy by investigating the Jeffersoni-
anism Brandeis embraced. It was clearly not what Merill Peterson has
termed "code Jeffersonianism." That is, Brandeis was not a western or
southern agrarian Democrat who "retained the traditional ethos of the
[Democratic] party in relatively pure form and believed that Jefferson,
78. This biographical sketch is a composite of the sources cited in note 11, supra. See also
L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 548 (1973); J. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL
CULTURE, 1908-1940, 29-46 (1981); J. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME
COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, 219-20, 312-16 (1978).
79. See, e.g., A. LIEF, supra note 11, at 30 (Brandeis said to be a partisan Democrat in
national politics from 1884).
80. See sources cited supra notes 13-14. See also A. LIEF, supra note 11, at 93 (Brandeis "an
old-fashioned Jeffersonian Democrat').
81. Cf. 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 418 (letter to publisher James Henle, Feb. 10, 1930)
(Brandeis' refusal to examine a 1930 volume concerning his socio-economic views prior to its
publication).
82. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD OR-
DER, 1919-1933, supra note 13, at 30 ("For Wilson, Jeffersonianism had been a faith; Brandeis
seemed to transform it into a policy . . ."); N. DAWSON, supra note 11, at 21 ("If one were
forced to reduce the complex blend of liberal and conservative elements in Brandeis' thought
to a formula, one could say that he advocated the use of liberal means to obtain conservative
ends. He was willing to use the power of the state, sometimes in surprising ways, to secure
and guard the traditional values to Jeffersonian democracy.").
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like the Messiah, would rise again."8 3 As a wealthy northeastern corpo-
rate attorney, Brandeis found Grover Cleveland's genteel, low-tariff,
pro-civil service mugwumpery more satisfying than code Jeffersonian-
ism; he rejected William Jennings Bryan and bi-metallism in both 1896
and 1908.84 Never averse to supporting good-government Republicans
in Boston municipal politics,8 5 Brandeis was by 1911 altogether outside
Jefferson's party.
Brandeis' interest in Jefferson as an historicalpersona appears to have
begun in 1926.86 He made his first trip to Charlottesville in September
1927, coming away from Monticello and the University of Virginia with
an overwhelming sense of Jefferson's personal greatness as a cultured,
educated Man of the Enlightenment. 8 7 Brandeis was attracted by Jef-
ferson's civility, not by his partisan political image. In perceiving Jeffer-
son primarily as a figure in the American cultural past, rather than as a
partisan politician, Brandeis was in accord with writers such as Albert
Jay Nock and Gilbert Chinnard, who presented a "new Jefferson" to the
nation in the mid-1920's.8 8 Nock's Jefferson was hardly the omniscient,
unerring political hero of partisan Democratic memory; rather, the
"new Jefferson," albeit an accomplished savant, was woefully deficient in
basic economic knowledge, a deficiency which allowed his arch-rival
Hamilton to shape the new republic's protectionist industrial
economy.
89
83. M. PETERSON, THE JEFFERSONIAN IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND 254 (1960).
84. Id. at 259 (Bryan and code Jeffersonianism); A. LIEF, supra note 11, at 366, 621 (Bran-
deis' high regard for Grover Cleveland); A. GAL, supra note 11, at 22 (same); I LETTERS, supra
note 11, at 123-24 (letter to Elizabeth Evans, August 6, 1896) (Brandeis' rejection of Bryan in
1896); 2 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 213-14 (letter to Alfred Brandeis, November 4, 1908)
(Brandeis' vote for Taft in 1908).
85. See A. GAL, supra note 11, at 92-95 (Brandeis and good-government Republicans in
Boston politics); 2 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 31 (letter to Alfred Brandeis, October 19, 1907)
(Brandeis asked by Boston GOP to run for mayor in 1907); A. LIEF, supra note 11, at 260
(Brandeis' GOP registration in 1911).
86. See 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 209 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, March 14, 1926)
(Brandeis reading Jefferson's biography).
87. Id at 302 (letter to Alfred Brandeis, September 22, 1927) ("Returned home last eve-
ning with deepest conviction of T.J.'s greatness. He was a civilized man."); td at 302 n.2
(letter to Felix Frankfurter, September 22, 1927) ("Alice & I have spent a day at Charlottes-
ville to see Monticello & the University. It is strong confirmation that T.J. was greatly civi-
lized. Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Hamilton were indeed a Big Four.").
88. See M. PETERSON, supra note 83, at 412.
89. See A. NOCK, JEFFERSON 192-93 ("Others were more quick than Mr. Jefferson to
assess the economic implications of Hamilton's fiscal system. By an odd coincidence, Mr.
Jefferson had stood by the bedside of its birth in Paris; he knew its parents and godparents,
both personally and by their writings, and yet seems never quite to have known what manner
of child had been brought fourth. . . . He had occasional brilliant flashes of insight into
fundamental economics and its relations to government, but they were too brief and unsteady
to be illuminating."); id. at 194 ("It does not appear that Mr. Jefferson's mind ever quite
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Brandeis' willingness to be called a Jeffersonian 9° in the 1930's takes
on new meaning given its basis in appreciation of the third president's
civility. 9' Brandeis did not advocate pristine Jeffersonian agrarianism
as a panacea for depression-ridden Americans in the 1930's, as others
did.92 Such a strategy would, following Nock's analysis, result in further
Hamiltonian economic development and eventually in distress. What
Brandeis, like Nock's "new" civilized Jefferson, did advocate was pol-
itical decentralization and the importance of vital local cultures.
9 3
Moreover, it should be noted that individuals of many ideological colors
claimed a Jeffersonian heritage in the 1930's. "Jefferson shaded the en-
tire political spectrum, from the American Liberty League on the far
right to the Communist party on the far left."
94
C. Brandeis as a Progressive Republican
Accurately delineating Brandeis' Jeffersonianism is far less important
than finding experimental federalism's political source. The assumption
that Brandeis was a partisan Democrat impedes progress in this inquiry,
too. For if Brandeis was, following the assumption, a Democrat but not
a code Jeffersonian (or states'-rights) Democrat, then what political be-
lief animated his federalism? Or was Brandeisian localism, as is sug-
gested alternatively by Schlesinger,95 no more than a personal "moral
preference"?
Brandeis' experimental federalism did indeed rest on a political foun-
dation. This foundation, however, will not be unearthed until the no-
tion that it rests on the rock of some type of Democratic ideology is
discarded. Brandeisian localism was formed against the backdrop of
Robert M. LaFollette's idiosyncratic brand of Progressive Republican-
ism. As noted above, Brandeis bolted the Democratic party in 1908 and
struck through to this fundamental ground of economic objection to Hamilton's fiscal system,
or that it ever effectively followed those which did."); i. at 202-03 (1926).
Brandeis read and commented favorably on Nock's work. See 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at
315-16 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, December 6, 1927). Late in the Justice's life, a popular
edition of Nock's book was issued, dedicated to him; id at 647-48 (letter to Bernard Flexner,
November 16, 1940).
90. See A. LIEF, supra note 11, at 478.
91. In the printed edition of his correspondence, Brandeis' last word on Jefferson was that
the third president was "our most civilized American and true Democrat." See 5 LETTERS,
supra note 11, at 648 (letter to Bernard Flexner, November 16, 1940).
92. See Leverette, Jr. & Shi, Herbert Agar and Free American. A Jefrsonzan Alternative to the
New Deal, 16 J. AM. STUD. 189 (1982).
93. A comparison of Jefferson's actions in the promotion of the University of Virginia and
Brandeis' efforts to reinvigorate the University of Louisville in the mid-1920's and 1930's
might prove to be interesting.
94. See M. PETERSON, supra note 83, at 363.
95. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL, supra
note 13, at 220 ("Localism was for him a moral preference, not a constitutional injunction.").
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voted for Taft. His subsequent disenchantment with Taft did not mani-
fest itself in an immediate return to the Democratic party; instead, it
took the form of Republican Insurgency and culminated in an attempt
in 1911 and early 1912 to help then-Senator LaFollette obtain the Re-
publican presidential nomination.
Brandeis met LaFollette not long after the future Justice's first trip
west of St. Louis. 96 A leader of the Midwestern Progressive Republican
Insurgents, LaFollette, like Brandeis, was a foe of the Trusts and an ad-
vocate of strict public control of American railroads.9 7 The two men
quickly became friends and worked together in 1910 and 1911 on behalf
of conservationist Gifford Pinchot in his struggle against Taft Adminis-
tration conservation policy in the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy. The
friendship deepened as time passed, enduring until LaFollette's death in
1925.
Never a favorite of the Republican Old Guard, LaFollette distanced
himself from the Taft Administration in 1910 and 1911. By November
1911, the Insurgent Wisconsin senator had been persuaded by similarly
disaffected Progressive Republicans to run for president in 1912. Indeed
Brandeis-a registered Republican in 1911-reportedly dined with La-
Follette on the evening that the fateful decision to run was made.
98
Brandeis campaigned hard for LaFollette. After delivering a stirring
address to Ohio Progressives on January 1, 1912, Brandeis toured the
midwestern states "urging LaFollette's nomination and declaring that
'only the revolutionary and Civil wars. . . surpassed in importance the
progressive movement . . .[then] before the people.' "99 These cam-
paign efforts, and those of other members of the National Progressive
Republican League, 10° seemed to be having the desired political effect.
LaFollette gained adherents outside Republican Insurgency's tradi-
tional Midwestern strongholds. For example, a mass meeting at New
96. A. GAL, supra note 11, at 120-2 1.
97. Se THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT M. LAFOLLETTE 62-64 (E. Torelle ed.
1920); H. MERRILL & M. MERRILL, THE REPUBLICAN COMMAND, 1897-1913, 73, 258, 301-
02 (1971); B. LAFOLLETrE & F. LAFOLLETT-E, ROBERT M. LAFOLLETTE 295-96 (1953).
98. H. & M. MERRILL, supra note 97, at 284-85, 286-87, 320; see also A. LIEF, supra note
11, at 260 (Brandeis' GOP registration in 1911); B. & F. LAFOLLETTE, supra note 97, at 361.
99. B. & F. LAFOLLETr'E, supra note 97, at 380.
100. The National Progressive Republican League was organized January 21, 1911.
Among its organizers are 9 leading United States Senators and 13 leading members of
the House of Representatives and 6 governors of states. This organization has for its
avowed purpose not only the election of United States Senators by popular vote, but the
establishment of the Initiative, Referendum, Recall, Direct Primaries, Corrupt Practices
Acts, and other democratic legislation throughout the country.
G. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY 20 n.6 (1912). See also PAPERS OF EDWARD P. COSTIGAN
RELATING TO THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN COLORADO, 1902-1917, 175-77 (C.
Goodykoontz ed. 1941).
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York's Carnegie Hall on January 22, 1912 was well-attended by enthusi-
astic partisans. 101
However, LaFollette's presidential campaign ended suddenly just a
few days after the Carnegie Hall rally. His daughter Mary was sched-
uled to undergo major surgery, a life-threatening ordeal in those days.
The strain of parental concern, added to the rigors of campaigning,
broke LaFollette's health and forced him to withdraw from the race.1
0 2
Returning from a speaking engagement in St. Louis, Brandeis wrote the
following note of consolation to Mrs. LaFollette: "My thoughts have
been much with you and Bob and the children . . . and I long to be
East where I may hear something authentic. Only make Bob take the
rest he needs and make a pleasure trip out of this necessity. When he
comes back we will take up the good fight again together.'
' 0 3
After LaFollette quit the contest, Brandeis gravitated toward Wilson's
camp. In time, Brandeis came to be one of Wilson's close advisors and
was, in fact, widely rumored to be destined for a legal post in Wilson's
cabinet. 10 4 However, despite these new political links, the Brandeis-La-
Follette connection endured. While strengthened by mutual affection,
the connection was primarily political. Wilson himself understood the
importance of this earlier political nexus; the only politician he con-
sulted prior to nominating Brandeis to the U.S. Supreme Court was
LaFollette.10 5
One characteristic of the archetypical American Progressive was an
inability to accept the restraints of regular party membership. Brandeis
shared this trait. While he occasionally expressed a hope in the 1920's
that he would live to see another Democratic president 10 6 and energeti-
cally supported Al Smith's Democratic candidacy against Hoover in
1928,107 he also continued his ties to LaFollette's Progressive Republi-
canism. For example, when LaFollette ran for president as an In-
dependent Progressive in 1924, Brandeis considered but declined an
offer to be his running mate.'10  Mrs. Brandeis wrote the following note
to Mrs. LaFollette shortly thereafter: "My great-indeed only regret is
that Louis should not be standing shoulder to shoulder with Bob in the
fight. But he will help, I feel sure, in his own way when the opportunity
101. See B. & F. LAFOLLETTE, supra note 97, at 388-89.
102. Id at 394-406.
103. Id at 406.
104. See A. MASON (II), supra note 11, at 375-97.
105. J. SEMONCHE, supra note 78, at 312.
106. See 5 LETT rERS, supra note 11, at 308.
107. Id at 260-62, 212, 360-64.
108. See B. & F. LAFOLLETrE, supra note 97, at 1085, 1115-16; see also K. McKAY, THE
PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT OF 1924, 134 (1947).
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offers." 10 9
Brandeis' loyalty to LaFollette in national politics had its equivalent
at the local level; Brandeis adhered to LaFollette's "Wisconsin Idea."
The Wisconsin Idea entailed the use of taxation as a conscious instru-
ment of social policy-Wisconsin was the first state in the nation to en-
act a progressive income tax on individuals and corporations' Q-and
legislation intended to ameliorate the lives of industrial workmen, such
as generous workmen's compensation laws and laws outlawing "yellow-
dog" contracts."' Advocates of the Wisconsin Idea prescribed tough,
searching regulation of rail carriers and other public utility corpora-
tions' 2 and a never ending vigil to protect the integrity of the political
process against corruption by "special interests."
'"1 3
These programs were to be advanced primarily at the state and local
levels. The integral part that localism played in LaFollette's Progressive
Republicanism is apparent in the writings of Frederick C. Howe."1
4
Howe, like Brandeis a corporate attorney," 5 was active in LaFollette's
1912 and 1924 presidential campaigns." 6 Howe and Brandeis, who cor-
responded until the 1930's, 1 7 were equally intimate with LaFollette."
I8
109. See B. & F. LAFOLLETTE, supra note 97, at 1115.
110. See W. BROWNLEE, JR., PROGRESSIVISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE WISCON-
SIN INCOME TAX, 1911-1929 (1974).
111. Cf J. PATTERSON, THE NEW DEAL AND THE STATES: FEDERALISM IN TRANSITION
18, 36 (1969).
112. THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT M. LAFOLLETTE, supra note 97, at 62-64.
However, railroad regulation was not, in practice, as stringent in Wisconsin as in some other
states. Cf J. PATTERSON, supra note 111, at 18.
113. See THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT M. LAFOLLETTE,supra note 97, at 20-
21; see also K. McKAY, supra note 108, at 143, 147.
114. See F. HOWE, THE CONFESSIONS OF A REFORMER (J. Braeman ed. 1967); Steiner,
supra note 15, at 774-75.
115. Howe was a partner in the Cleveland, Ohio firm of Garfield, Garfield & Howe.
116. Howe was Secretary of the National Progressive Republican League in 1911; see 2
LETTERS, supra note 11, at 403-05 (letter to Frederick C. Howe, February 7, 1911); I. at 406
(letter to Howe, February 13, 1911); id at 544-45 (letter to Howe, February 13, 1912). He
was also president of the New York City-based Insurgents' Club, the group which arranged
the January 1912 Carnegie Hall meeting for LaFollette; see B. & F. LAFOLLETTE, supra note
97, at 389. A member of the Committee of Forty-Eight, Howe attended the national Confer-
ence for Progressive Political Action in Chicago in February 1922. He was named Chairman
of the Committee on Organization and, later, Secretary of the national Committee of Fifteen;
see K. McKAY, supra note 108, at 62-64. Howe handled the groundwork for LaFollette's
speeches in 1924; see B. & F. LAFOLLETrE, supra -note 97, at 1130.
117. See N. DAWSON, supra note 11, at 71-72, 75; Steiner, supra note 15, at 782 n.107.
118. As when they sat with the Wisconsin Senator monitoring the 1916 Republican Con-
vention. See B. & F. LAFOLLETTE, supra note 97, at 570. Howe met LaFollette in 1907. Id at
224. He considered the LaFollette Republican platform of 1910 the best partisan document
of its kind ever written. Id at 306.
Like LaFollette, Howe had doubts about the American entry into World War I. He wrote
a critical book, WHY WAR (1916), which LaFollette recommended to his older son. Id at
913. Howe's wife, herself a radical, Was held by Secret Service agents in 1919 and was not
permitted to see her husband or an attorney. Id at 938. LaFollette himself suffered great
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In The City, the Hope of Democracy (1905), Howe argued that meaning-
ful urban reform would be forthcoming only if American cities were
granted extensive home rule powers. Howe was confident that, if decen-
tralization within the states were accomplished, the American city
would then truly be a democratic "experiment station, offering new ex-
periences to the world."'"l 9
Decentralization on the national level in the form of federalism was
assumed by Howe and by LaFollette Progressive Republicans generally.
In Wisconsin: An Experiment in Democracy (1912), a work which may have
been intended to serve as a LaFollette campaign tract, Howe empha-
sized the political primacy of the states.
[P]robably our most conspicuous political failure . . . the state has wide
possibilities. It controls the machinery of nomination and election for fed-
eral, state and municipal officials . . . the success or failure of the city is
traceable to the laws which the state enacts. . . . The state is the source of
civil and criminal law, of domestic and industrial relations. It is the guard-
ian of the peace, of the health and education of the people. It controls the
roads and highways. It regulates the railroads and common carriers . . .
Its taxing power is ample to promote a social policy.' 20
In an "efficient commonwealth,"' 2 much might be accomplished to im-
prove social conditions. LaFollette's Wisconsin was, Howe said, "a
state-wide laboratory in which popular government is being tested in its
reaction on people, on the distribution of wealth, on social well-
being."1
22
It was essential to the advocate of the Wisconsin Idea that state and
verbal abuse by pro-war zealots in the years 1917-1919. Further, Howe was so close to LaFol-
lette that he was said to be the most likely first biographer of the Wisconsin Senator. See J.
CHAMBERLAIN, FAREWELL TO REFORM: THE RISE, LIFE AND DECAY OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MIND IN AMERICA 242 (1965 ed.).
Eventually, Howe became Consumers' Counsel in the Federal Agricultural Adjustment
Administration during the New Deal. He was demoted during the purge of 1935. P. IRONS,
supra note 11, at 131, 177-79.
119. F. HOWE, THE CITY, THE HOPE OF DEMOCRACY 303 (1905). For Howe's status as
an urban theorist, see Frisch, Urban Theortis, Urban Reform and American Political Culture in the
Progressive Period, 97 POL. Sci. Q. 295, 311-12 n.47 (1982).
120. F. HOWE, WISCONSIN: AN EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY vii-ix (1912).
After the several states have prepared the way by giving to the people direct and contin-
uous control over all the branches of government, they are ready to direct their attention
more profitably to the problems connected with the prevention and relief of social and
economic distress. Because they are not so strictly limited by their constitutions, because
they can more easily amend their constitutions when they are limited, because of the
liberal interpretation of the so-called police power, states are able to grapple with mod-
ern social and economic problems much more effectively than the federal government
can.
B. DE WI"T, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: A NON-PARTISAN, COMPREHENSIVE Discus-
SION OF CURRENT TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 244 (1915).
121. F. HOWE, supra note 120, at ix.
122. Id at vii.
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federal judges refrain from invalidating the experimental legislation
which emerged from home-rule cities and laboratory states. LaFollette
Progressive Republicans were extremely critical of judges who routinely
struck down statutes and ordinances as unconstitutional. Indeed, La-
Follette personally regarded "the least dangerous branch" as no less
than a "judicial oligarchy."'
123
The judiciary has grown to be the most powerful institution in our govern-
ment . . . . [B]y usurping the power to declare laws unconstitutional and
by presuming to read their own views into statutes without regard to the
plain intention of the legislators, they have become in reality the supreme
law making and lawgiving institution of our government. They have
taken to themselves a power it was never intended they should exercise; a
power greater than that entrusted to the courts of any other enlightened
nation. 124
Brandeis was also concerned by the almost cavalier manner with
which some federal judges struck down state statutes. In a 1914 intro-
duction to Albert Barton's LaFollette's Winning of Wisconsin, 1894-1904
(1922), he wrote the following words, words which interweave ideas of
experimental federalism and judicial restraint in a way which strikingly
anticipated the New State Ice dissent:
Lovers of American liberty are full of hope; but the period of boyish exu-
berance has been followed by one of maturer consideration of the grave
problems of democracy. The need of solving these problems is urgent.
There is insistent demand for political and social invention. The best con-
ceived plans for the amelioration of our conditions will require for success
laborious development of details, careful adjustment to local conditions,
and great watchfulness for years after their introduction. We must en-
courage such social and political inventions, though we feel sure the suc-
cesses will be few and the failures many. Most of these inventions can be
applied only with the sanction and aid of the government. It is America's
good fortune that her federal system furnishes in the forty-eight states pohical and
social laboratories in which these inventions may be separately worked out and tested,
thus multiplying the opportunities for inventors and minimizing the dangers of
faiure.
125
123. G. ROE, supra note 100, at vii.
124. Id. at vi-vii.
125. Brandeis, Introduction to A. BARTON, LAFOLLETrE'S WINNING OF WISCONSIN, 1894-
1904 (unpaginated) (1922) (emphasis added).
This chronology for experimental federalism helps to explain Holmes' use of the concept in
his dissenting opinion in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) ("There is nothing that
I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compul-
sion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important part of the
community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even though the
experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most
respect.") and Brandeis' complaint about Holmes' discounting of most social experiments; see
Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 106 (Holmes to Brandeis, prob-
ably concerning the Truax dissent: "Generally speaking I agree with you in liking to see social
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Thus, it seems beyond cavil that Brandeis' experimental federalism
and its immediate political source in LaFollette's Wisconsin Idea and
not,pace Laski, Schlesinger and the American historical community, in
mere twentieth-century Jeffersonianism. Further, it is clear that
Brandeisian localism cannot be reduced, as Schlesinger would some-
times have it, to nothing more than personal "moral preference."
D. Brandeis' New State Ice Dissent
In the early 1930's, Progressive Republicanism was again much on
Brandeis' mind. The Justice perceived 1929-32 as a repetition of 1909-
11, the years in which he had been most closely and directly identified
with Senator LaFollette and Progressive Republican Insurgency. In
May 1930, for example, Brandeis succinctly expressed this view in a let-
ter to Norman Hapgood:
Politically-things American have taken a great turn since May 1929.
The Hoover debacle is more complete than that of Taft in 1909-10; and
the distance between promise and performance is greater. The opposition
[to Hoover] in the Senate-[a] coalition of insurgent Republicans and
Democrats-has been very able led and has proved very effective. Norris,
Borah, [the younger Robert] LaFollette and others have shown much abil-
ity; and the Democrats (among others, some new men like [future Supreme
Court Justice Hugo] Black) have done much to redeem the shattered Dem-
ocratic reputation.
l2 6
Brandeis concluded one year later that "times [are] hopeful for
progressives."l
2 7
experiments tried but I do so without enthusiasm because I believe that it is merely shifting
the pressure and that so long as we have free propagation Malthus is right in his general view.
P.S. Your slight twit-that it is easy for those who don't suffer to philosophize-touched me.
I have known some suffering in my day..."). The complaint seems somewhat exaggerated
in light of Brandeis' own devaluation of most social experiments in the passage quoted in the
text to this footnote.
Holmes undoubtedly took the concept of experimental federalism from Brandeis, who was
using it in correspondence in the months prior to the Truax decision; see 5 LETTERS, supra note
11, at 16 (letter to Seventh Circuit Judge Julian Mack, a fellow Zionist, September 20, 1921)
(regarding the Jewish State: "Beware of constitutional limitations in Social Economic Exper-
imentation"); id at 17 (letter to Harold Laski, September 21, 1921) ("America has not been
averse to social-political experimentation. But there has been a twofold lack of study and
care in developing and adjusting inventions; and a lack of both patience and persistence in
applying them. Few of our political inventions have had, therefore, a fair test."). In his
separate Truax dissent, which Justice Holmes interestingly did not join, Brandeis urged the
Court not "to close the door to experiment within the law." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. at
357 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
126. See A. MASON (II), supra note 11, at 600-01.
127. Id at 601.
Brandeis was certainly not alone in this perception. Recent historical work indicates the
vitally important role played by Insurgent Republicans-especially in statehouses and the
U.S. Senate-from 1929 to 1935. D. BURNER, THE POLITICS OF PROVINCIALISM: THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN TRANSITION, 1918-1932 (1970) (Democratic party fragmentation af-
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The Wisconsin Idea took on renewed significance for Brandeis early
in 1932. At that time, a special session of the Wisconsin state legislature
summoned by Governor Phil LaFollette, a Progressive Republican like
his father, enacted an unemployment insurance reserves bill. 128 Bran-
deis had been advocating such a scheme, in one form or another, for
twenty years. This advocacy was reflected in the Wisconsin legislation.
The enacted bill had been drafted by the Justice's daughter and her
husband; their draft had, in turn, been based on an outline supplied by
Brandeis in mid-1931.
129
Wisconsin's unemployment insurance law-signed by Governor La-
Follette four weeks before oral argument in New State Ice-was clearly
on Brandeis' mind when New Sate Ice was decided. For example, the
Justice wrote the following to Harold Laski nine days after oral argu-
ment in the case:
The Unemployment Reserves Act recently adopted in Wisconsin is our
first step in grappling with irregularity of employment. Possibly you saw
Elizabeth's recent articles in the Survey Graphic. She and [her husband]
Paul have had the largest part both in drafting the bill and in securing its
passage. 130
None of this concern with Progressive Republican politics is apparent
in the earlier portions of Brandeis' New State Ice dissent, which was writ-
ten in his standard technical, heavily-annotated style. The Justice first
explained the intended function of certificates of public convenience
and necessity in contemporary public-utility regulation.' 3 1 He then
ter World War I, weakness during the 1920's and slow reunification); R. MUDDER, THE IN-
SURGENT PROGRESSIVES IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND THE NEW DEAL, 1933-1939
(1979) (gradual shift away from support of the New Deal to forthright opposition); L. ASHBY,
THE SPEARLESS LEADER: SENATOR BORAH AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN THE
1920s (1972); R. FEINMAN, TWILIGHT OF PROGRESSIVISM: THE WESTERN REPUBLICAN
SENATORS AND THE NEW DEAL xipassim (1981) ("As the 1930s began, the progressive Re-
publican Senate bloc members were regarded as being among the leading reformers in Amer-
ican politics.").
128. See B. MURPHY, supra note 11, at 93-96; D. NELSON, supra note 76, at 118-28; JOUR-
NALS AND INDEXES OF THE 1931 SPECIAL SESSION OF THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE 3-4, 60,
216-19, 442 (1932); ADVENTURE IN POLITICS: THE MEMOIRS OF PHILLIP LAFOLLETrE 163-
65 (D. Young ed. 1970).
129. See B. MURPHY, supra note 11, at 95.
130. 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 497-99 (letter to Harold Laski, February 28, 1932)
(quoted passage); id at 526-27 (letter to Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush, November 17,
1933) (referring to the Unemployment Insurance Reserves Act as the "Wisconsin idea").
Brandeis in 1932-33 instructed Frankfurter to use whatever political clout he possessed to
have Massachusetts follow Wisconsin's legislative lead. See D. NELSON, supra note 76, at 177-
93 (ultimately unsuccessful introduction of a Raushenbush/Frankfurter unemployment
reserves bill in Massachusetts in 1933); B. MURPHY, supra note 11, at 96; Freund, A Centennial
Memoir, supra note 11, at 781 (the Brandeis-Wisconsin plan's heavy emphasis on employer
responsibility rather than simply on high employee benefits).
131. 285 U.S. at 282-83.
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noted that "the conception of a public utility is not static,"'1 32 implicitly
criticizing Justice Sutherland's use of the procrustean Wolf public-util-
ity categories in the majority opinion. Finally, he attributed to the 1925
Oklahoma ice statute rationality sufficient to withstand scrutiny by a
reviewing court. '
33
Having completed these statutory apologetics, Brandeis moved on to
more important matters. He addressed the nation's economic woes,
practical political measures which might be undertaken to ameliorate
conditions and the federal judiciary's role in reviewing remedial state
legislation. Americans in 1932 were, Brandeis asserted, "confronted
with an emergency more serious than war,"'134 an economic emergency
engendered, in Brandeis' Keynesian view,135 by chronic underconsump-
tion. 136 One possible strategy in dealing with the complex problem of
balancing productive capacity and consumption would be to require
would-be entrepreneurs to obtain certificates of public convenience and
necessity prior to embarking on new ventures, in effect applying the reg-
ulatory technology of the 1925 Oklahoma ice statute to all sectors of an
economy.
3 7
To say that a given strategy was judicially countenanced by Brandeis
is not to say that he personally advocated it. Indeed, in the New State Ice
dissent Brandeis clearly recognized that the certificate-of-public-conven-
ience-and-necessity remedy "might bring evils worse than the disease" it
was intended to treat. 138 Further, the Justice was quite sceptical of the
many economic "stabilization" plans circulating in the winter of 1931-
32, particularly those entailing centralized national economic
planning. 1
39
Brandeis' preferred long-term remedy for serious economic distress in
a capitalist economy, employer-financed unemployment insurance
reserves, was aimed directly at "irregularity of employment," which
Brandeis described as the "greatest of . . . evils" in the New State Ice
132. Id. at 284.
133. Id at 285-300.
134. Id at 306.
135. See thfra text accompanying notes 151-56.
136. 285 U.S. at 307-08 n.52.
137. Id. at 308-09.
138. Id at 309.
139. Id at 308-09 n.53; A. MASON (II), supra note 11, at 601 (need to save the country
from General Electric executive Owen D. Young, a conservative-planning Democrat); R.
HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ACT: BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT
AND THE TRADE ASSOCIATION ISSUE, 1921-1933 88-134 (1976); 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at
537-38 n.2 (letter to Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush, April 22, 1934) (Brandeis' opposition
to National Recovery Administration and centralized economic planning in 1934).
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dissent. 40  This reference to "irregularity of employment" and to
schemes to relieve unemployment provides direct textual support for the
assertion that the New State Ice dissent's language about the experimen-
tal legislative efforts of"a single courageous State"' 4 1 primarily referred,
not to Oklahoma's unprecedented 1925 ice statute, but rather to Wis-
consin's new unemployment insurance reserves legislation. If this is the
case, then much more than an abstract fear of federal judicial preven-
tion of state legislative experimentation animated Brandeis' New State
Ice dissent. A substantial political interest-the survival of the Wiscon-
sin unemployment insurance scheme-undergirded Brandeis' apologia
for federalism. This substantive political interest was also reflected in
Brandeis' assertion in the New State Ice dissent that he could not "believe
that the framers of the fourteenth amendment, or the States which rati-
fied it, intended to deprive [Americans] of the power to correct the evils
of technological unemployment and excessive productive capacity
which have attended progress in the useful arts."'
1 42
III. Brandeis and British Progressivism
The foregoing historical analysis of the New State Ice dissent supports
Justice O'Connor's recent observation that "state innovation" has been
"no myth" in American political history.1 43 Further, it connects the
concept of states as laboratories with a vital political tradition of experi-
mental state politics: whatever might be said of the tenth amendment,
experimental federalism is no negligible truism. More will be said
later144 of the political theoretical underpinnings of experimental feder-
alism. At this point, a further unpacking of Brandeis' experimental fed-
eralism will be undertaken to reveal its second, trans-Atlantic, source.
140. 285 U.S. at 308.
141. Id. at 311.
142. Id.
143. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982). According to
Laski:
One who comes to America from Europe may well crave leave to doubt whether, funda-
mentally, there is truth in the judgement that federalism is conservative. The forms, it is
true, may be preserved, may even seem to be revered as sacred things, but the spirit
glows with a life that is ever new and abundant. The one. thing that must strike the
modern observer of any federal Constitution is the growing impatience with its rigid
encasement, the ever insistent demand that the form shall be made equally elastic with
the spirit. And in the variety of its group life, the wide distribution of guarantee of its
perennial youth.
H. LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 275 (1917).
144. See rnfra, text accompanying notes 176-241.
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A. Graham Wallas and the Yellow Book
The British Progressive best known to Americans was probably Gra-
ham Wallas. 145 In works such as Human Nature in Poitics (1908) and The
Great Society: A Psychologt'calAnalysis (1914), Wallas applied a philosophi-
cal psychology to the political problems facing industrialized nations in
the early twentieth century. He argued that a series of inventions in
technology and the useful arts in the nineteenth century had sparked
economic growth in the Western world. However, this growth had con-
siderable social costs, in Wallas' view, such as technological unemploy-
ment (and underemployment) and unsanitary working conditions in
some trades. Therefore, Wallas thought that a corresponding series of
"social inventions" was necessary, not only to add to the happiness and
well-being of the citizenry, but also to ward off a cold, technocratic
Fabian socialism. 
146
Brandeis, a personal friend of Wallas, 147 frequently used the English
philosopher's concept of "social invention" in defending controversial
state legislation against fourteenth amendment challenges. 148 For exam-
ple, while seeking to uphold an Oregon minimum-wage law for women
in December 1914, Brandeis stated that America's "social and industrial
welfare demands that ample scope should be given for social as well as
145. See M. WIENER, supra note 15.
146. See G. WALLAS, THE GREAT SOCIETY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 3, 81-85, 182-
87, 355-61, 367 (1914). One begins to wonder about the novelty of Lyndon Johnson's polit-
ical programs after discovering that the Great Society was Wallas' concept and that Lloyd
George, as a British Progressive, seems to have announced the first governmental "war
against poverty" in 1909. See Dutton, supra note 15, at 876.
147. See 4 LETrERS, supra note 11, at 403-05 (letter to Alice Brandeis, June 24, 1919).
148. In 1931, Max Lerner had the following to say about Brandeis:
In two important respects he stands out from the group of turn-of-the-century liberals
with whom his name is associated. He had a passion for detail and concreteness where
most of them dealt in invective and generalities. And he had a capacity for constructive
achievement in the field of social legislation and social invention.
• .. In the stress he laid upon social invention he was closely related to the Jeremy
Bentham whom Mr. Wallas interprets; more closely even than was the administrative
constructiveness which the Webbs were seeking to effect in London.
Lerner, supra note 11, at 6. See also, Brandeis, supra note 125 ("social and political invention"
in a 1914 anticipation of the experimental federalism concept).
Frankfurter also employed the concept of "social invention" frequently. See, e.g., F.
FRANKFURTER, The Taste of Administrative Law, in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS
OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 234 (A. MacLeish & E. Prichard eds. 1939) ("Profound new forces
call for new social inventions, or fresh adaptations of old experience. The 'great society,' with
its permeating influence of technology, large-scale industry and progressive urbanization,
presses it problems; the history of political and social liberty admonishes us of its lessons"). See
also F. FRANKFURTER, Social Issues Before the Supreme Court, id. at 48, 52; F. FRANKFURTER,
Why lam For Governor Roosevelt, id. at 329, 331; F. FRANKFURTER, What We Confront in American
Life, id at 334, 337.
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mechanical invention.' 149 The notion also appears in the New State Ice
dissent. 15
Other aspects of Brandeis' thought at the time of New State Ice show
tell-tale signs of British Progressive influence. For example, the Justice's
underconsumptionist theory of the Great Depression and his early'5 1 ad-
vocacy of massive public works (to be undertaken by state govern-
ments 152) as an antidote to unemployment can both be derived from
1920's British Progressivism. In particular, they can be derived from the
British Liberal party's 1928 "Yellow Book" on industrial policy-Brit-
ain 's Industrial Future. 153
The Yellow Book was an "exhaustive and penetrating survey of the
British post-war economy" written by a group of New Liberal intellectu-
als and politicians headed by Lloyd George and Keynes. The work fea-
tured, in addition to various currency and securities law reforms, a
proposal to "absorb unemployment and re-equip the country for future
prosperity by a great programme of public works." 154 Brandeis read the
Yellow Book and was deeply influenced; he described it as "the most
comprehensive reasonable and generally able modern state paper" in
existence. 155 The Justice's public-works Keynesianism, a trait recently
highlighted by Dawson, 156 coupled with his admiration for Graham
Wallas' British Progressivism, suggests a second, trans-Atlantic source
for experimental federalism.
149. L. BRANDEIS, The Constitution and the Minmum Wage, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS:
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 52, 68 (0. Fraenkel ed. 1934).
150. 285 U.S. at 304.
151. See N. DAWSON,supra note 11, at 28-29, 30-33 (Brandeis' advocacy of public works in
1932-33). Franklin D. Roosevelt's adoption of large-scale spending-at the federal level-as a
way out of the Depression did not occur until 1938. The following words are needed to make
clear Roosevelt's political genius and economic ineptness:
The medicine actually used [to combat the 1937 "Roosevelt Recession"] was pure
Keynes. Very quickly it relieved the pain. The patient was soon as well as it had ever
been in the thirties-but only after Roosevelt floundered for months in greater indecision
than Hoover had in 1930 and 1931.
P. CONKIN, FDR AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WELFARE STATE 99 (1967). For a discussion of
Roosevelt's resistance to Keynesianism, see H. STEIN, THE FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA
39-59, 131 (1969). (FDR's conversion to Keynesianism in the period 1937-39.) It should be
noted that the younger LaFollette and the other Progressive Republican senators were far
more ready to espouse public-works programs than was Roosevelt.
152. See 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 527-28 (letter to Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush,
Nov. 19, 1933) (Brandeis' plan of public works for the Wisconsin Progressive Party).
153. LIBERAL INDUSTRIAL INQUIRY, BRITAIN'S INDUSTRIAL FUTURE (1928).
154. Campbell, The Renewal of Liberalzim." Liberahsm without Liberals in THE POLITICS OF
REAPPRAISAL, 1918-1939, 88, 104 (G. Peele & C. Cook eds. 1975); LIBERAL INDUSTRIAL IN-
QUIRY, supra note 153, at 280-360.
155. See A. MASON (II), supra note 11, at 599-600; see also, Clarke, The Progressive Movement
in England, supra note 15, at 179-80 (quoting Graham Wallas on Liberalism after publication
of the Yellow Book).
156. N. DAWSON, supra note 11.
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B. Harold Laski and Experimental Federahsm
History abounds in instructive ironies. Harold Laski's advocacy of
experimental federalism in 1925-26, seven short years before he dis-
missed Brandeis as an ideological relic, 5 7 must be considered one of
these.
A lecturer in government at Harvard College from 1916 to 1920,
Laski befriended then-Professor Frankfurter. Through Frankfurter,
Laski became acquainted with Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the lead-
ing contemporary exponents of federal judicial self-restraint. Learning
American federalism from these three masters, Laski quickly grafted it
onto the stock of his own pluralist political theory. 158 By 1917, Laski
was employing American federalism as a foil to arguments emanating
from political monists, ie., from persons who believed that sovereignty
was necessarily indivisible and that, therefore, power was preferably
centralized. ' 59
In what has been perceived as his finest theoretical work,1 60 A Grammar
of Politics (1925), Laski articulated his belief in strong local self-govern-
ment and in the value of American-style federalism. Not only did par-
ticipation in local government serve as a vital part of the average
citizen's political education, it also facilitiated socio-economic experi-
mentation. 16 1 American-style federalism "provide[d] the means for im-
portant experiment[s] in social matters, while restricting the necessary
157. See supra note 13; see also, H. LASKI, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A COMMENTARY
AND AN INTERPRETATION 212 (1948) ("Jeffersonian Democrats like Justices Brandeis and
Cardozo"); id at 441-42 (Brandeis' "almost Jeffersonian conception of democracy").
158. See B. ZYLSTRA, FROM PLURALISM TO COLLECTIVISM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
HAROLD LASKI'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 72-77 (1968).
159. Aside from the historical accident which has given the constituent States of the
American federation a certain sovereignty. . . it may well be argued that Hamilton and
his coadjutors would have had theoretical justification even if they had not had history
to guide them in their determination of the division of constitutional powers. That divi-
sion is more consonant with political facts than the unitary theory so favored by the
majority of European observers. Certain local groups have a life of their own that is not
merely delegated to them by the State [read: the national government]. They are capa-
ble of directing their own concerns. Their interest in themselves is revivified and inspired
by the responsibility for such direction. When New York wants a new Constitution it
can apply itself to that manufacture. When Australia needs one, or Canada, they must
be made-the phrase is sinister-in Whitehall. The history of Lord Grey's experiments
in the direction of colonial self-government makes clear the utter inadequacy of the latter
method. If Wisconsin wants an income tax it can obtain one by winning the assent of its
citizens. If Manchester wants a ship canal it must persuade Parliament that its needs are
more important than the jealousies of Liverpool.
H. LAsKI, supra note 143, at 271-72. See also id. at 274 ("The price of liberty is exactly diver-
gence of opinion on fundamental questions"); id at 281-82 (advocating state, rather than
uniform national, action on the prohibition question); id at 284 (quoting Brandeis on the
virtues of small units).
160. See B. ZYLSTRA, supra note 158, at 2-3 n.2, 94.
161. See H. LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 413 (1925).
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area of the experiment, and, therefore, what danger may be inherent in
its nature."'
162
Returning to Britain, Laski gave experimental federalism a trans-
Atlantic flavor in the 1920's. The advantages of experimental federal-
ism were never clearer to Laski than in 1926, when the House of Lords'
judicial decision in the Poplar case' 63 impelled him to write judicial Re-
view of Social Pohcy in England for the Harvard Law Review. 164 In the Pop-
lar case, the socialist borough council's political decision to pay its
employees higher wages than the Conservative national government
thought "reasonable" was, in effect, reversed by the House of Lords.'
6 5
For Laski, this case seems to have had the impact the famous Lochner
case had on Justice Holmes: he believed that the House of Lords had
invalidated the borough council's acts simply because they were predi-
cated on economic assumptions the law Lords found politically
distasteful. 166
The Poplar case threatened to delegitimate the British judiciary. This
was a development which, in Laski's eyes, threatened far more than the
outer bulwarks of the legal establishment. According to Laski, when the
judicial office was brought into controversy, it was "always a sign of
malaise in the [political] life of the community."' 167 Further, judicial
overreaching was contrary to basic Anglo-American political impulses.
Laski considered Anglo-Americans to be animated by "an experimental
philosophy of government" which led them to value local self-
government. 168
162. Id. at 422.
163. Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A.C. 578.
164. Laski,Judiial Review of Social Pohcy in England- A study of Roberts v. Hopwood et al ,
39 HARV. L. REV. 832 (1926).
165. Laski, supra note 164, at 834-35.
166. Id. at 847-48.
The Poplar case was, in a sense, the culmination of a series of legal skirmishes between the
Poplar borough council, led by future Labour party leader George Lansbury, and more con-
servative (and sometimes Conservative) regional and national authorities. See R. v. Poplar
Borough Council ex parte London County Council) (No. 1), [1921] All E.R. 429; R. v. Poplar
Borough Council ex parte London County Council (No. 2), [1921] All E.R. 437; Poplar
Metro, Borough Assessment Committee v. Roberts [1922] All E.R. 191. Interestingly, there
are indications that some sort of experimental localism may once again emerge in Britain's
opposition parties in light of current Tory plans to restrict the ability of left-wing local coun-
cils to spend; see When the Cap Fits, ECONOMIST, January 14, 1984, at 14.
167. See Laski, supra note 164, at 846-47.
168. Laski's apostasy from experimental federalism seems to have occurred after 1930.
See H. LASKI, THE DANGER OF BEING A GENTLEMEN AND OTHER ESSAYS 229 (1940) (speak-
ing of Holmes in 1930: "He has not made himself the jailer of experiment.... He has
recognized, as some of his colleagues have failed to recognize, that the American Constitution
does not forbid experiment, but asks only that experiment shall be tender to established ex-
pectation"); id at 231 (in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), "Mr. Justice
Holmes made it plain that not only does federalism mean variety in unity; it means also, in
the proper sphere, a license to experiment with the unknown, a right to sail one's ship upon
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Laski's espousal of experimental federalism in the 1920's is indicative
of the trans-Atlantic nature of the broader Progressive movement of
which Brandeis, LaFollette and Howe were integral parts. American
Progressives have been the subject of intense historical scrutiny and of
no less intense historiographic debate. Attempts to isolate single socio-
economic and/or ideological traits as the Progressive quintessence have
failed, and the current wisdom1 69 is that American Progressivism was
irreducibly plural in nature. Thus, to recognize the existence of identifi-
ably Progressive American businessmen who sought to impose order on
a rapidly changing society is not necessarily to deny the Progressive la-
bel to consumer groups interested in combating business "corruption" of
the American political process.
170
American Progressives argued endlessly and came to no generally ac-
cepted conclusions about ideology. However, they tended to regard
(and Brandeis, as a Progressive, did in fact regard) the following three
issues as of paramount ideological importance: (1) the prevention or
elimination of economic monopolies; (2) the maintenance of social
bonds in the face of rapid socio-economic change (including the New
Immigration of the 1890's from eastern and southern Europe); and
(3) the attainment of social efficiency.'
7 '
the rocks. He has wisely set his face against the idea that the constituent states of the Ameri-
can Commonwealth are to limit their activities to cannons of conduct which some vital inter-
ests . . . thought beneficial to themselves. He may have believed the experiment foolish; not
seldom one can glimpse a smile of indulgence even in the cold print of the decision. But he
has steadfastly refused to substitute his own wisdom for the foolish experiments of others,
granted only that the right to experiment is there."). Laski's rejection of experimental feder-
alism as well as the trans-Atlantic Progressivism he had shared with Brandeis had several
causes: (1) the shift from "progressive" being shorthand for Liberal-Labour cooperation in
British politics to being indicative of anti-Socialist (Liberal-Tory) coalitions, especially in mu-
nicipal politics; see Cook, Liberals, Labour and Local Elections, in THE POLITICS OF REAP-
PRAISAL, 1918-1939 166 (G. Peele & G. Cook eds. 1975); (2) Laski's activity in British
electoral politics-in which federalism was a non-issue-led him to devalue pluralist values
like diversity and forms of pluralism like federalism; see B. ZYLSTRA, Supra note 158, at 94-103;
H. LASKI, THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM 21-24 (1940) (lecture at London School of Econom-
ics advocating national, centralized economic and social planning). Laski's appreciation of
diversity had so weakened by the mid-1930's that he was able to write quite optimistically
about the Soviet Union; see B. ZYLSTRA, supra note 158, at 166-68 n.162; H. LASKI, THE
DANGER OF BEING A GENTLEMAN AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra, at 59 ("[T]here are definitely
many features in which [Soviet culture] brings law more substantially into relation with jus-
tice than anything the Common law system has so far been able to attain").
169. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 15, at 113-15, 126.
170. For a discussion of Progressive businessmen, see, e.g., S. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND
THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY (1959); R. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (1962); R. WIEBE, SEARCH FOR OLDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
For a discussion of Progressives as consumers resisting business "corruption" see D. THELEN,
THE NEW CITIZENSHIP: ORIGINS OF PROGRESSIVISM IN WISCONSIN, 1885-1900 (1972); R.
MCCORMICK, FROM REALIGNMENT TO REFORM: POLITICAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK
STATE, 1893-1910 (1981).
171. See Rodgers, supra note 15, at 123-26. For a discussion of Brandeis and monopolistic
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Even before Teddy Roosevelt's centralizing New Nationalists clashed
with Wilson and the advocates of the New Freedom in 1912, compara-
ble reform activity shook the British body politic. Certain members of
the Unionist (Tory) party, many of whom followed Roosevelt's New Na-
tionalists in admiring Hamilton, 172 urged that social ills in industrial-
ized Britain be cured by using funds generated by higher import duties;
this was the Tariff Reform program. 173 The Progressive Alliance of
New Liberals and Labourites agreed with Tariff Reformers that ame-
liorization was necessary, but disagreed about financing. The British
Progressives preferred to finance reform with the proceeds of redistribu-
tive direct taxation. 174 While historians are only now beginning to ap-
preciate fully British Progressivism's political force, it is clear that
Progressivism was an important factor in British center-left politics from
the mid-1890's until the early 1930's.
175
IV. The Philosophical Roots of Experimental Federalism
As Jan Deutsch has argued, a precedent-the legal artifact created by
the jurist's choice between theoretically possible grounds of decision in a
case-cannot be sprung from its temporal context. 17 6 For a precedent
from time A to be relevant in Deutsch's sense to lawyers and judges at a
later time, say X+50, it must be perceived both as a rational judicial
solution to the set of issues before the court at A and as a legal develop-
ment which promises to contribute significantly to a just future, both at
X+50 and beyond. 1 7
7
Most legal scholars and jurists agree that economic substantive due
process of the sort displayed by the majority in New State Ice is deserv-
edly dead and buried. 178 Brandeis' dissent is generally perceived as a
practices, see A. GAL, supra note 11, at 23-25. For a discussion of Brandeis and social bonds,
see id. at 125, 148-49. For a discussion of Brandeis and "social efficiency" see id. at 142-43,
158; A. MARTIN, supra note 11, at 160-62.
172. Compare F. OLIVER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: AN ESSAY ON AMERICAN UNION
(1907) with H. CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1912).
173. See A. SYKES, supra note 15, at 288-90; Dutton, supra note 15, at 879-84.
174. See A. SYKES, supra note 15, at 288-90; B. MURRAY, supra note 14; A. OFFER, PROP-
ERTY AND POLITICS, 1870-1914: LAND-OWNERSHIP, LAW, IDEOLOGY AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT IN ENGLAND 221-406 (1981).
175. See Clarke, supra note 15, at 177-8 1; Campbell, The Renewal of Liberalsm. Liberalism
without Liberals, in THE POLITICS OF REAPPRAISAL, 1918-1939 88 (G. Peele & C. Cook eds.
1975).
176. See Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553 (1974); Deutsch, Corporate
Law as the Ideology o/Capitalism, 93 YALE L.J. 395, 396 (1983).
177. Deutsch, Precedent andAdj'udiation, supra note 176, at 1584.
178. But see, McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court.- An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34; Jackson & Jefferies, Commercial Speech. Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 511-70 (10th ed. 1980).
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rational if not optimal solution to the issues presented to the court in
New State Ice. The foregoing historical analysis enhances this percep-
tion. It states the constitutional and political issues involved in the case
and Brandeis' proposed solution-active state governments, experi-
menting without harassment by federal courts.
179
However, it is less clear that most legal scholars and judges currently
perceive experimental federalism as a significant contribution to a just
future. A few scholars, seeing no justice in American federalism, would
not be disturbed by the disappearance of the states as distinct political
entities. 180 Others are better described as attracted to the pure theory of
federalism, but are uneasy with what have been presented to them as
typical federalist claims. Such persons understandably find little to
cheer them in the essentially racist, Southern Democratic states'-rights
tradition. For this second group, the preceding pages can and should
operate to restore a repressed faith in the American federal system. Un-
packing the New State Ice dissent locates this version of American feder-
alism in a different, more attractive political tradition; it thereby helps
to make the dissent a relevant precedent.'"
Accordingly, the foregoing historical analysis has focused on contro-
verting the characterization of Brandeis as a Jeffersonian Democrat and
of Brandeisian localism as mere twentieth-century Jeffersonianism. The
analysis should be understood as an attempt to render harmless a potent
ideological weapon used to delegitimate federalism-the association of
federalism and federalists with the Jeffersonian Democratic impulse.
When an American jurist (it could be Brandeis; it might be Rehn-
quist ' 2 ) is depicted as a Jeffersonian in robes, a complex political im-
agery is evoked. Individual liberty and local self-government appear,
but clothed in apparel (the intellectual/ideological equivalents of pow-
dered wigs and knee breeches) which virtually entails residence in a hall
of atavisms. The liberty is decidedly of the negative sort; it is colored by
179. This is not to say that state legislatures would legislate without any enforceable con-
stitutional limits. Brandeis believed that due process required judicial review, but by state
rather thanfederal courts, at least in the overwhelming majority of cases. See Oklahoma Oper-
ating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920); Oklahoma Gin Co. v. Oklahoma, 252 U.S. 339 (1920).
For a similar perspective, see Hart, The Power of Congress to Liunit theJursdiction of Federal Courts.
An Exercise i Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953). Brandeis also clearly saw structural
limits to state experimentation embedded in the federal constitution's commerce clause. For
a discussion of this topic, see infra note 261.
180. Professor Robert Cover, for example, expressed this sentiment in a response to a
question at a 1983 symposium on the New Deal, sponsored by the Yale Law Journal.
181. Cf. Gordon, Histor'cisrn tn Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1021 (1981) (recovery
of past political languages may threaten to make the past irrelevant to contemporary legal
concerns).




a preference for minimal government.1I 3 The Jeffersonian cry for local
self-government, admirable in the context of 1776, loses appeal and
credibility when repeated by Calhoun and then by Secessionists and
sundry other white racists. 8 4 And, of course, the imagery's economic
setting is archaic; sturdy yeoman farmers flourish on all sides.
Restoring experimental federalism's true Progressive (and Progressive
Republican) colors enables the modern federalist to avoid the snare so
carefully set by federalism's detractors. Brandeisian localism, as a Pro-
gressive phenomenon, assumes the existence of a political world in
which liberty is positive. State governments therein are not minimalist
institutions. Wisely or not, they engage in a wide variety of official acts
which, whatever their ultimate effects, are intended to promote the gen-
eral welfare. The yeomen have vanished, replaced by cooperating mar-
ket farmers and industrial workers.I8 5 Finally, and most importantly to
contemporary legal minds, experimental federalism has been a stranger
to Jim Crow. Lynchings and cross-burnings were not LaFollette Pro-
gressive Republican "social inventions."
However, before the New State Ice dissent can be definitively estab-
lished as a relevant precedent in the full range of contemporary consti-
tutional adjudication, experimental federalism's potential contributions
to a just future must be delineated.
Experimental federalism can contribute significantly to a just future
because it resonates strongly with the most distinctive strand in Ameri-
can political culture. It emerges from the non-legalist, ultimately Aris-
totelian conception of politics which, contrary to the obsession of
American political theorists with Locke and social contract theory,' 86
183. Id at 1363-65.
184. See, e.g., Cover, The Origins ofJudicza1 Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1304 & n.54 (1982) ("With the Reconstruction Amendments, the very idea of feder-
alism became closely associated with race"). More recently, this cry was echoed by
Southerners opposed to the school desegregation orders of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). For example, five Southern legislatures adopted resolutions "interposing" their
sovereignty between the federal government and their people. See I RACE REL. L. REP. 437-
47 (1956).
185. See supra notes 110-19; R. FEINMAN, TWILIGHT OF PROGRESSIVISM: THE WESTERN
REPUBLICAN SENATORS AND THE NEW DEAL, supra note 127, at 13.
186. See Pocock, The Myth ofJohn Locke and the Obsesston with Liberahsm, in JOHN LOCKE:
PAPERS READ AT A CLARK LIBRARY SEMINAR 3 (1980); Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment
Revisited: A Study in H togy and ldeologv, 53 J. MOD. HIST. 49 (1981).
It is, for example, a conventional wisdom that American political tradition is overwhelm-
ingly, even monolithically Lockean; and though this now seems historically unsound-
the thesis of Louis B. Hartz cannot be said to have stood the rest of time-any attempt,
like that recently made by Garry Wills, to remove Locke from the center of American
values is sure to provoke vigorous response. There exists what I have elsewhere termed a
"myth of liberalism," which traces its undivided sway from the appearance of the sys-
tems of Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth century; and the destruction wrought upon
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served as the ideological framework within which the Framers did their




has deep roots in the American constitutional past, which makes it espe-
cially palatable to interpretivist tastes. It also offers a more satisfactory
account of several aspects of contemporary American political experi-
ence than do liberal rights-based theories. Civic individualism stresses
the importance and value of specifically political activity. Experimental
federalism is no more than the adaptation of civic individualism to the
American federal system.
A. Civic Virtue
The dominant political language in the new American republics from
1776 to 1787 was generated by the concepts of "virtue" and "corrup-
tion."' 8 8 It was, ultimately, an Aristotelian language, transmitted to the
North American continent by way of Florentine civic humanism, James
Harrington and the "Country" opposition to early Hanoverian adminis-
trations in Great Britain. 89 In this political language, man was defined
(and defined himself) as a zoon poh/tikon or political animal, not as a
bearer of rights. 19°
The "virtuous" political animal was "independent." That is, he'91
this myth, both by the rediscovery of republican thought and by the discovery that Scot-
tish moralism had more to do with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson than Locke, has pro-
duced rejoinders which attempt to minimize the republican component or subsume it
under liberalism.
Id. at 70 (footnotes omitted).
187. Public or civic individualism does not deny the value or the significance of the
primarily personal interests and desires on which private individualists lay so much em-
phasis. Satisfaction of at least the most fundamental of these interests--eeds, as they are
likely to be called this context-is necessary to life itself and hence is, in at least this
sense, a necessary condition of the satisfaction of other interests. But from Aristotle for-
ward civic individualists have insisted that there are interests and desires, purposes and
objectives that cannot be served or satisfied apart from the public, political realm. The
activities that satisfy these latter interests are intrinsically or necessarily public in charac-
ter; they are directed to ends and objectives shared among persons as members of a
political order and they can only be pursued through interaction among persons so iden-
tified. These interactions redound to the benefit of individuals, but to individuals in
their character as members of a political order, in their character as citizens.
R. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS 204 (1976) (footnote omitted). See also id at 9.
188. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); J. POCOCK, POLITICS, LAN-
GUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 104-47 (1973).
189. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION, supra note 188, at 333-505.
190. Id at 462-65, 550-51; Pocock, irtues, Rights and Manners." 4 Model for Historians of
Pohtal Thought, 9 POL. TH. 353, 357-60 (1981).
191. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION, supra note 188, at 465, 475 (sexism
of early eighteenth-century British "Country" Opposition ideology).
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owned landed property or maintained a trade 92 and was armed. 193
These traits enabled him to engage in the republic's political life with-
out being easily susceptible to administration (or "Court") "corrup-
tion." A number of devices were employed to subvert the body politic:
standing armies, national debts, and places or pensions for elected polit-
ical representatives did "corruption's" work.
194
The U.S. Constitution of 1787 defines individuals consistently with
this political idiom: it speaks of citizens. 195 (It was only in 1791 that
individuals were also officially recognized as bearers of federal rights.)
The primary fora for the exercise by citizens of civic virtue were, under
the Constitution, the several states. Federalist No. 45 makes this point
well:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal govern-
ment are few and defined. Those which are to remain the State govern-
ments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce; with which last the [federal] power of taxation will, for the
most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to
all the objects which, in the ordinary course of ajfairs, concern the lives, hberti'es, and
properties of the people, and the ithernal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State. 196
Further, the preconditions of civic virtue-owning real property and
bearing arms-were constituted and/or regulated by state rather than
federal law. 197 Real property was protected from direct federal taxa-
tion, 98 arms-bearing citizens were organized in militias governed by
state laws, except when the militias were in the service of the federal
government. Even then, militiamen were trained and commanded by
officers chosen by state governments.199
The Aristotelian-based language of civic virtue "continued to domi-
192. Id. at 423-61.
193. See Shallope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599
(1982); Kates, Handgun Prohibition and The Origt alMeanng of the SecondAmendment, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 204 (1983).
194. See Steiner, Separating the Soldierftom the Citiren." Ideology and Criticism of Corporal Punish-
ment in the British Armies, 1790-1815, 8 Soc. HIST. 19, 20-21 (1983).
195. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2;
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. It is of some interest that federal judges are not explicitly required
to be U.S. citizens.
196. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 303 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1937) (emphasis added).
197. For exceptions to this generalization, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (federal government
control of intellectual property); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (federal government control of
territorial landed property).
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (requirement of uniform federal taxation); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9 (prohibition of direct taxes by federal government not apportioned to census figures).
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; THE FEDERALIST, No. 46, at 309-11 (J. Madison) (E. Earle
ed. 1937) (local ties of state militia officers); See Kates, supra note 193, at 230-35.
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nate the American mind in the nineteenth century,"20 0 albeit in altered
form. The key change was that non-landed property of all sorts-even
government securities, long regarded as the ultimate "corrupting" pos-
session-could be said after 1830 to confer the "independence" neces-
sary to qualify one for engagement in American republican politics.2 0,
The struggle to produce qualifying property, always a part of the citi-
zen's (or would-be citizen's) task, was unduly exalted: material success
served, by 1850, as the gauge of civic virtue.20 2 With this shift in em-
phasis, "the model independent citizen of the original doctrine had be-
come something essentially different, the ideal free enterpriser.
'2 0 3
Notwithstanding this development, which subordinated republican
civic virtue to a rights-based acquisitive liberalism, 20 4 the distinctive ac-
cents of the older idiom could yet be heard in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. For example, federal civil service reformers inveighed against
political corruption and spoke of the need to purify American politics by
abolition of the spoils system. 20 5 The anti-imperalists of 1898 invoked
the authentic language of civic virtue, associating imperial government
with an inevitable decay in domestic American political life.
20 6
Brandeis' initial encounter with the political language of civic virtue
may have come during his period of active opposition to American im-
perialism.20 7 But whatever the exact circumstances of Brandeis' expo-
sure to this political language, one thing is quite clear: he was using it in
the 1920's and 1930's. For example, Professor Tushnet recently argued
that the famed Whitney v. California concurrence-with its emphasis on
the primacy of political activity in the states-should be located in the
civic virtue paradigm.2 08 Brandeis also read G.D.H. Cole's The Life of
200. Berthoff, Peasants and Artisans, Puritans and Republicans.. Personal Liberty and Communal
Equahty in American Histogy, 69J. AM. HIST. 579 (1982); See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADI-
TION, supra note 188, at 513-52. See also L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION:
EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); but see, Kramnick, Republican Reoisionism Revisited,
87 AM. HIST. REV. 629 (1982) (attempt to reinstate Lockean liberalism as the American
ideology around 1760).
201. See Berthoff, supra note 200, at 585-86; Berthoff, Independence and Attachment, Virtue and
Interest. From Republican Citizen to Free Enterpriser, 1787-1837, in UPROOTED AMERICANS: ES-
SAYS TO HONOR OSCAR HANDLIN 97-123 (R. Bushman et al. eds. 1979).
202. Berthoff, supra note 200, at 585.
203. Id. at 585-87.
204. See Berthoff, supra note 200; Berthoff, supra note 201.
205. See Berthoff, supra note 200, at 596-98.
206. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION, supra note 188, at 542-45.
207. Brandeis was a member of a Boston based "Committee of Fifteen," a forerunner to
the anti-imperialist Philippine Information Society. See 1 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 147-59.
(letters concerning activities of Philippine Information Society, dated November 13, 1900 to
January 22, 1901).
208. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down.- A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Princi-
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Wilh'am Cobbell, an early nineteenth-century English "Country" ideo-
logue, 20 9 and was moved by it to contrast a politically active citizenry
which responded to public duties with a compliant, non-political popu-
lace which relied on "paid expert[s]" or "mercenar[ies]" (the latter term
evoking Country imagery of the strongest sort 2 10 ) to perform their pub-
lic obligations. In the 1920s, Americans resembled the latter group. A
pessimistic Brandeis then wrote about America's inadequate store of
political virtue2 ' and about the nation's complacency about corruption
in the age of Teapot Dome.
2 12
Further, Brandeis' reading in the 1920's traced the political language
of civic virtue back to its Greek sources. In December, 1923, he in-
formed Frankfurter that he was "deep again in early Italian history,
now in the thirteenth century from which much modern wisdom may be
deduced. '21 3 This comment is particularly revealing given Professor
Skinner's recent finding that the civic virtue paradigm re-emerged in
thirteenth-century Italian city-states. 21 4 Brandeis also expressed an in-
terest in Roman history and the political works of Tacitus and Cicero.
21 5
More importantly, his "daily companions" were English-language books
on the Greeks.
2 16
As an adherent to the politics of civic virtue, Brandeis did not believe
that transfer payments to the less advantaged in a society were to be
justified on the ground that beneficiaries had a right to such payments.
On the contrary, "[i]mprovement in material conditions of the worker
and ease are the incidents of better conditions-valuable mainly as they
may ever increase opportunities for development", 21 7 especially political
self-development. Transfer payments, in a word, were justifiable only so
long as they served the purposes of civic virtue.
For Brandeis, political self-development was a process which occurred
ples, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 798-99 (1983) (discussing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); see also Rabban, supra note 11, at 1321-22 n.719.
209. 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 227-28 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, July 2, 1926).
210. See Steiner, supra note 194, at 20 n.6, 32.
211. 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 228 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, July 2, 1926).
212. Id at 324 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, February 22, 1928).
213. Id at 106 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, November 20, 1923).
214. Q. SKINNER, THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE RENAIS-
SANCE (1978).
215. 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 185 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, September 1, 1925).
216. Id at 140-41. (letter to Adele Brandeis, September 29, 1924). Perhaps the most
influential of these was Zimmern's THE GREEK COMMONWEALTH, (1911), an exhaustive and
critical economic and political analysis of the Greekpoh'. See Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in
MR. JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 119 (Zimmern's book was the one Brandeis urged visitors to
read. In addition, a passage from Zimmern was paraphrased in his Whitney v. California
concurrence, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
217. 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 45-46 (letter to Robert Walter Bruce, Feb. 25, 1922).
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primarily in states and localities. With political development came
political responsibility; indeed, responsibility was the best index of pol-
itical development. 218 The paradigm of civic virtue may help to ac-
count for Brandeis' hostility to federal court diversity jurisdiction and to
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. 2 19 In this paradigm, citizens of a state
(including corporate citizens) ought not to be able to engage in remu-
nerative economic activity in a state, operating in markets regulated or
constituted by the state, and then to escape the responsibilities imposed
by that state's law by invoking federal diversity jurisdiction and federal
common law. This would amount to an abuse of state citizenship, a
type of political irresponsibility signalling political underdevelopment.
Finally, experimental federalism should be seen as the major struc-
tural feature of Brandeis' world of civic virtue. States were laboratories
for creative politics, for socio-economic "inventions" arising out of the
collective and responsible exercise of individuals' civic virtue. The
maintenance of that civic virtue required collective political self-
restraint; external restraints on state political processes might correct ex-
cesses or mistakes, but only at the cost of eroding civic virtue.220 That
cost, for Brandeis, was too high. Hence, it was his judgment that federal
courts should not intervene in state political matters simply because the
loser in a state or local political battle claimed abridgement of a federal
constitutional right. To do so, the theory continues, is not only unneces-
sarily and illegitimately to aggrandize the power of the federal govern-
ment vis-a-vis the states and localities; it is also to sap the civic virtue
upon which American liberty, in the last resort, depends.
B. Rights-Based Liberal Individualism
Instead of predicating his federalism on a conception of politics as the
practice of civic virtue, Brandeis could have adopted a rights-based the-
ory of political decentralization. Such a theory was readily available.
For example, in his Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, Thomas Cooley
stated that "[t]he right of local self-government cannot be taken away,
because all our [state] constitutions assume its continuance as the un-
doubted right of the people, and people as an inseparable incident to
218. Id. at 46.
219. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (federal courts have discretion to determine "general law"
in diversity cases, regardless of state law on the subject). See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938) (Brandeis, J.) (overruling Swift). See generally T. FREYER, HARMONY AND DIsso-
NANCE: THE SWIFr AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 84-94, 131-138 (1981) (dis-
cussing Brandeis' early exposure to the Swfl problem and his drafting of the Ere opinion).
220. See 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 45-46 (letter to Robert Walter Bruere, February 25,
1922); id at 204-05 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, January 24, 1926).
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republican government. 2 2 1
From the political theorist's point of view, Brandeis' choice of the
Aristotelian-derived political language of civic virtue over that of rights-
based liberal individualism was felicitous. The Justice thereby avoided
fashioning a state of nature, an artificial world of dubious ontological
status within which its framer invidiously drains most social content
from individuals, the carefully selected residuum serving to account for
political association as seen by the framer. 222 The social content the
framer leaves in individuals in this state of nature (or "original posi-
tion") largely determines which rights will be emphasized as "funda-
mental" in the ensuing socio-political life.22 3 An examination of the
many critiques socialists and conservatives have offered of rights-based
liberal individualism would be beyond the scope of this essay. It is, how-
ever, fair to say that the autonomous, self-determining liberal individual
of the social contractarian tradition is often perceived as incredible, and
that the state of nature device is primarily a means of dodging hard
questions, such as how allegedly isolated individuals manage to agree to
form societies or bodies politic absent shared means of agreement, such
as language.
22 4
What is particularly important to this essay is that the civic individu-
alism implicit in Brandeisian localism better accounts for the particular
rights found in Anglo-American political cultures than does rights-based
221. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 192 (3d ed. 1874)
(emphasis added). See also id. at 40, 208 ("The American System is one of complete decentrali-
zaton"); People ex rel. Leroy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 96-99 (1871) (Cooley, J. concurring)
(discussing right to local self-government); T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 378-79 (3d ed. 1898); 1 DILLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 16, 18, 24 (3d ed. 1881) (dis-
cussing local self-government and decentralization).
222. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 31-32, 230
(1981); S. HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACTION 34 (1959) ("the self-refuting assumption of
man in a partial state of nature, retaining one social institution, one means of communication
and one set of conventions, but one that he has freely invented for himself, without the prior
institutions, the means of communication and conventions, which would enable him to attach
a sense to his invention").
We cannot now separate the world as we now see it, as a result of the infinitely compli-
cated evolution of our ways of thought and speech as civilised beings, from the world as
it really is, somehow divided into its elements by a "natural" system of classification...
In any man's experience, Nature has always been overlaid by, and approached through,
a set of social conventions, the conventions of a language in being. . . . The world is
always open to conceptual re-arrangement. But the re-arrangement is only the addition
of new tiers of discrimination to a foundation that remains constant . ...
Id at 39-40.
223. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 222, at 230-34.
224. See, e.g., S. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 222, at 34; A. MACINTYRE, supra note 222; M.
OAKESHOTr, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS (1962); P. WINCH, THE IDEA
OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE (1958).
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liberal individualism.2 25 Beginning with the Hohfeldian insight that X's
right imposes a correlative duty on Y (or a member or class of YS),226
Flathman has argued that rights-based liberal individualism, which is
admittedly useful in expounding the number and scope of X's rights,
cannot adequately explain why Y (or a class of Ys) should continue to
accept the burden of correlative duties. 227 Liberal rights-theorists may
attempt to justify the imposition of duties on Y (or a class of Ys: the task
becomes especially difficult in countermajoritarian circumstances) by
postulating broadly defined "shared public values" or the existence of
an "interpretative community" within which such burdens are accepted
as incidents of membership. 22 8 To the extent that these moves appear to
be attractive or persuasive, however, they necessarily undercut the more
basic rights-based liberal individualist premise that individuals are au-
tonomous, associate beings whose rights must be preserved to the maxi-
mum extent possible in politically-organized society.
Flathman's response to the dilemma of Ys accepting duties correlative
to X's rights refers to the socio-political context in which individuals are
embedded, and within which the practice of rights takes place (and
form). Indeed, the practice of rights derives not only its form but also its
primary importance from that socio-political context. 229 F's acceptance
of or acquiescence in the correlative duties following from the assertion
of a particular right by X depends upon the political recognition of X's
right-claim by the political community in which Y is a member. The
rights-claims of X which are not accorded political recognition may be
disregarded by Y, especially in the absence of private, non-political ties
or relations that might alter the situation.
Not only does civic individualism better account for Y's acceptance of
or acquiescence in correlative duties, but it also helps to explain the pre-
ferred position that politically-related rights enjoy in Anglo-American
communities. If rights are components of a socially-constituted practice
rather than brute facts, and if that practice is importantly political (as it
is and has been in Anglo-American political culture), then it follows that
rights related to political practice-especially the so-called Great Rights
against the State-are paramount.230  Hence, for example, political
225. See R. FLATHMAN, supra note 187, at 2.
226. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as App/led in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE LJ. 16 (1913).
227. R. FLATHMAN, supra note 187, at 38-63.
228. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN L. REV. 739 (1982); Cover, Foreword-
Nomos and Narratie, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1983).
229. See R. FLATHMAN, supra note 183, at 9passim.
230. When allied to this conception [of civic individualism] the notion of individual
rights, and especially the Great Rights [read: freedom of speech, press and association;
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speech enjoys a preferred position in American constitutional law. 23 1
C. Federahsm
The emphasis on the political content of rights separates Brandeis'
experimental federalism, which rests on a conception of politics as an
exercise of civic virtue, from Justice Brennan's views on federalism. For
Brandeis, federal rights merely enhance the primarily political lives of
citizens in the several states. Thus the federal judiciary, which is pri-
marily concerned with federal rights, should not intervene to alter the
results of state political processes. As Brandeis' mentor J.B. Thayer
wrote: "Under no system can the power of courts go far to save a people
from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere."
23 2
Justice Brennan's federalism is rather different. 233 Politics therein is
defined by and largely limited to the realization and adjustment of pre-
ferred or "fundamental" rights. The federal Constitution, in this con-
ception, defines individuals as bearers of certain fundamental rights
which cannot be abridged but which may be augmented by the
states. 234 Federalism is, for Brennan, therefore little more than a
habeas corpus], takes on a significance very different and very much greater than that
which it carries in private individualism. Having such rights is important not merely to
protect individuals in what they now are and in what they now have, but also to make it
possible for them to develop to a level that they have not yet achieved and could not
achieve without engaging in the activities that the liberties protect. The political order is
thought of as an opportunity, not a threat.
Id at 205.
231. Id at 9passim. As has recently been noted, the first amendment itself is essentially
the result of federalist considerations. Congress' power to regulate political speech was denied
in order to preserve power in this sensitive legal area in the several states. See Mayton, Sedi-
tious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 128 n.191,
131-133 (1984).
232. J. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 39 (1908).
233. Brennan's version of federalism is a narrow one-way street. States, as grantors of
rights, are enjoined from distributing them in bundles less ample than the federal Constitu-
tion-as interpreted by a court which can take "selective incorporation" seriously-demands.
On the other hand, distribution in greater quantities than a majority of the (post-Warren
Court era) U.S. Supreme Court thinks absolutely required is permissible and, indeed, en-
couraged. This is basically a reactive position used by advocates of greater or more equally-
distributed rights-bundles when the federal high court is not listening. It has nothing to do
with experimental federalism as conceived by Brandeis. Brennan's one-way federalism is now
vulnerable to attack on the ground that state court decisions seeking merely to instantiate
Warren Court era federal constitutional law are not based on "adequate and independent"
state grounds. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983) (O'Connor, J.)
(reversing state supreme court opinion as based exclusively on erroneous federal fourth
amendment law).
234. For a criticism of the historical and judicial processes by and through which certain
federal constitutional rights came to be viewed as "fundamental," see my chapter on Philip-
pine law in the American period, from 1898 to 1935 in 2 LAWS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA (B.
Hooker ed. 1984) (forthcoming).
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"double source of protection for . . .rights. '235
Justice Brennan's conceptions of politics and federalism are one-sided
and profoundly unsatisfactory. Professor Tushnet employs a kind of so-
cial psychology to express his dissatisfaction with this rights-based con-
ception of political life. For Tushnet, politics is a realm of civic virtue
which affords members of local communities the important experience
of ruling and being ruled. (Tushnet labels this the experience of "the
Constructed Other. ' 236) In Brennan's world, this experience is trivial-
ized. However, even when not trivialized, politics cannot be said to be
the only valuable engagement in life. There are important activities in
which individuals engage apart from, and sometimes in fixed opposition
to, the local community's political consensus. (Tushnet terms this the
experience of "the External Other. ' 2 3 7) Federal constitutional law exists
as it does-or did before the Warren Court-in order to allow individu-
als simultaneously to realize political and private, non-political
satisfactions.
Tushnet's observations are better framed in Aristotelian, or diluted
Arendtian, rather than social psychological language.238 Notwithstand-
ing dubious success in translating much of experience into legalistic for-
mulae, Anglo-Americans have characteristically defined themselves as
political animals. Political engagement has been and currently is
viewed as necessary to the actualization of human potential. That being
the case, it is difficult not to agree with Brandeis rather than with mod-
ern rights-based liberal constitutional theorists: the study of politics
(and not the study of deontological moral philosophy) is the first
science.
239
Federalism properly viewed allows civic individuals to achieve their
political potentialities through socio-economic experimentation. The
235. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of lndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,
502-03 (1977).
It is worth noting that even the later Bickel had difficulty disentangling citizens from their
appurtenant rights; see A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33-54 (1975) (citizenship as
a Lockean/contractarian rights-based phenomenon). It is frankly difficult to base federalism
and a theory of judicial self-restraint on a rights-based political theory. Perhaps this accounts
for the tortuousness of Bickel's analysis and his ultimate reliance on the foggy Burkean notion
of tradition.
236. See Tushnet, Deviant Science in Constitutional Law, 59 TEX. L. REV. 815, 816 (1981).
237. Id.
238. Like Brandeis, Arendt was impressed by Danish cooperatives and by the eighteenth
century American device of federalism; see H. ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 216 (1972)
(Danish and Israeli cooperatives commended. This is Brandeisian in two respects-(l) Bran-
deis' interest in Danish cooperatives and his Zionist endeavors, which also included coopera-
tives; and (2) Arendt's invocation of "experimental" language); H. ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION 248-55 (1965) (early American federalism and what Arendt calls the "revolu-
tionary tradition").
239. See 5 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 260 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, January 27, 1927).
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state, in this conception, is an essential laboratory producing skilled
political practitioners as well as a number of (more or less) successful
experiments. At the same time, the structure of American federalism
permits excesses in political experimentation to be surgically excised.
State political activity in an experimental federalist world is checked
only when it no longer conforms-in the sense of bearing a discernible
family resemblance-to Anglo-American political traditions. 240 This
check is preferably internalized in the state political ethos. Failing that,
the check is to be applied by state courts. Only rarely, in this concep-
tion of American federalism, will federal courts properly play any part
in checking experimental political processes. 241
V. The Reemergence of Experimental Federalism
A series of recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions confirms the relevance
of the New Slate Ice dissent. The line of cases beginning with Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp. 242 and extending to White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employers, Inc. ,243 recognizes the power of the states and state
political subdivisions to engage in socio-economic experimentation as
market participants without being subjected to commerce clause analy-
sis. This development is particularly interesting given the apparent de-
mise of the related doctrine of state sovereignty enunciated by Justice
Rehnquist in National League of Cities v. User. 2 4 4
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., the Court faced a seemingly un-
precedented legal situation 2 4 5 in which the constitutionality of a Mary-
land statute creating a market in automobile hulks was challenged by
an out-of-state entrepreneur legally unable to participate as fully as
could in-state entrepreneurs. The challenge, which was successful in the
240. This check operates as Justice Frankfurter's "fundamental fairness" due process stan-
dard did: something would have to be shocking to a well-educated, Anglo-American con-
science to be unconstitutional in either conception. See Israel, supra note 73, at 322 ("One of
the major justifications advanced for the fundamental fairness doctrine is that it pays heed to
Justice Brandeis' admonition [in New State Ice] by providing ample room for diversity (and
thus experimentation).").
241. See Hart, supra note 179.
242. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
243. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983); see also United Building and Construction Trade
Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 52 U.S.L.W. 4187, 4189-91 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984)
(No. 81-210) (affirming market participant immunity doctrine, distinguishing privileges and
immunities clause/comity considerations).
244. 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see also Note, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV.
70, 70-78 (1983).
245. A purist might argue that the first case in the line was American Yearbook Co. v.
Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972), af'dmem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (Florida law requir-
ing all government printing to be done by in-state printers valid).
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trial court, was urged on both commerce clause and fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection grounds.
246
Writing for a six Justice majority, 247 Justice Powell reversed the court
below and rejected both challenges to the Maryland statutory scheme.
The holding embodying the rejection of the commerce clause argument
is particularly pertinent: "Nothing in the purposes animating the Com-
merce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action,
from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its
own citizens over others.
'248
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dissented
with some force. Brennan did not accept the market-participant immu-
nity doctrine fashioned by the majority. He would have applied stan-
dard commerce clause analysis-which involves balancing local interest
in the challenged regulation or taxing scheme against the burden the
statute places, directly or indirectly, on interstate commerce-to the
Maryland statute and have found it unconstitutional. 249 Professedly un-
able to find "any articulated principle justifying" the majority holding,
Brennan inferred that the "motivating rationale" behind it was the
"newly announced 'state sovereignty' doctrine of National League of Cities
v. Usey," 250 which was decided the same day.
Notwithstanding this assimilatory inference, Hughes and National
League of Cities have led separate lives in markedly different circum-
stances. The latter case, which held that "Congress may not exercise [its
commerce clause] power so as to force directly upon the States its
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made," 251 has been heavily (if not al-
ways lucidly) criticized by academic commentators, 252 eroded as a pre-
246. Brief for Appellee at 62-63, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)
("Maryland's statutory payment of bounties for all scrap which is processed in local plants,
while denying payment for scrap exported for processing, may be a novel form of discrimina-
tion .. .Maryland's bounty system, being unique, is without precedent in this Court. But
the discriminatory aspect ...is not immunized by its novelty.").
247. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined
in Powell's opinion.
248. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (Powell, J.).
249. Id. at 817-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250. Id at 822 n.4.
251. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.)
(extension of wage and hour provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act to state and municiple
employers constitutes invalid exercise of commerce clause power).
252. See, e.g., Tribe, Unravehng National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Ajirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977); Michelman, States' Rights
and States' Roles. Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE
L.J. 1165 (1977). For critical assessments of this literature, see Nagle, Federalism as a Fundamen-
tal Value. National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 81; Deutsch, Harvard's




cedent by lower federal courts253 and eviscerated, if not altogether
overruled, by the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming.
254
The basic principles of Hughes, on the other hand, have drawn less
critical fire from academics 255 and, more importantly, have been reaf-
firmed several times by the Court. A recent reaffirmation may be found
in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,256 decided a
mere two days prior to the Wyoming case. Perhaps the best indication of
Hughes' happier fate is the fact that Justice Brennan, who led the dis-
senters in both Hughes and National League of Cities and who wrote the
plurality opinion limiting the latter case in Wyoming, silently concurred
in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in White.
Recourse to market-participant commerce clause immunity has been
dictated by the willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to allow
the commerce-regulating powers of Congress to validate virtually any
federal governmental act. Since Wickardv. Filburn,257 the Court has per-
ceived the commerce clause as a positive instrument of nationalization
and not, as then Professor Frankfurter put it, as the means by which an
"accomodation is achieved between the interacting concerns of states
and nations. 2 58 Hence, adherents to creative federalist principles after
Wickard have been forced to take refuge in enclaves purportedly outside
the reach of Congress' commerce clause powers, such as the Parker v.
Brown /state-action antitrust "immunity" 259 and the market-participa-
tion doctrine.
Justice Brandeis, as a civic individualist and experimental federalist,
would have recognized this legal development, for it was anticipated in
253. See Phillips, The Fate of National League of Cities (unpublished manuscript on file
with the Yale Law &Polzcy Review).
254. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983) (extension of Age Discrimination in Employment
Act to cover state and local governments constitutes valid exercise of commerce clause
power).
255. For criticisms of Hughes, see Varat, State "Cit ienshzO" and Interstate Equaly, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 487, 504-08, 530 and n.175 (1981) (criticizing Hughes-market-participant immu-
nity); Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietag Dzstinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA.
L. REV. 1072, 1121-26 (1980); id at 1125 ("To allow the states to Balkanize the national
economy through its proprietary activities would be a triumph of form over substance...")
256. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983). See also United Building and Constitution Trades
Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 52 U.S.L.W. 4187, 4191 (U.S. February 21, 1984)
(No. 81-210).
257. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
258. F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE 21 (1937).
259. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Recent cases have narrowed substantially
the protections of this enclave. See Community Communications, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455
U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97 (1980); City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1976).
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his own day. In the 1980's, governmental action by states and localities
which can be characterized as "market regulation" may be (and often
is) struck down by federal courts employing commerce clause analysis;
politically-equivalent governmental concern manifested in legislation or
administrative orders which can be characterized as state "market par-
ticipation" escapes this fate. Similarly, in the 1920's, the heyday of sub-
stantive economic due process, government regulation of merchants and
markets was often struck down as violative of the commerce clause or,
alternatively, of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Government participation as a merchant in municipal markets (then
more quaintly called "State & municipal trading" 26° ) was, on the other
hand, typically legitimated by federal courts. For example, when the
Progressive Republicans who governed North Dakota attempted to reg-
ulate the wheat trade in 1919, they were twice rebuffed by a commerce
clause-wielding Supreme Court. 26' However, when these same Progres-
sive Republicans established state-owned wheat mills and grain eleva-
tors and a state-owned commercial bank, the relevant legislation was
unanimously held to be constitutional by the Supreme Court against a
fourteenth amendment due process challenge. 262 Indeed, the Supreme
Court's self-restraint in the face of state and municipal market action
reached a high-water mark in 1927, when Lincoln, Nebraska's operation
of non-profit gasoline stations-undertaken to reduce Standard Oil's
power in local markets-was summarily approved by the Supreme
Court.
26 3
Brandeis saw in this constitutionally-approved "State & municipal
260. See 5 LErrERS, supra note 11, at 315-16 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, December 6,
1925).
261. Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922) (Day, J.); id. at 61 (Brandeis,
Holmes and Clarke, JJ., dissenting). See Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925)
(Van Devanter, J.); id. at 203 (Brandeis, J., dissenting without opinion). While Brandeis
dissented from the court's opinion in these two cases, he did recognize some commerce clause
(structural) limitations on state experimental politics. See, e.g., Interstate Transit, Inc., v.
Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931) (Tennessee state tax on interstate bus company not related to
permissible tax purposes; tax held violative of commerce clause); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267
U.S. 307 (1925) (application of Washington certificate of convenience and necessity regula-
tory scheme to purely interstate trucking company intending to use highway constructed with
federal dollars violates commerce clause; no relation shown in this instance to permissible
state regulatory purposes). However, the limitations Brandeis perceived left ample room for
state experimentation, coming into play only when state legislatures directly burdened inter-
state commerce without being able to advert to permissible regulatory purposes.
262. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920) (Day, J.) (legislation which provided for
state manufacture and marketing of farm products, provision of housing, creation of state
banking system, issuance of bonds and collection of cases held not violative of fourteenth
amendment due process rights of state taxpayers); Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920) (Day,
J.); see also Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917) (Day, J.) (Portland, Maine statute
establishing a municipal, non-profit wood/fuel yard constitutionally permissible).
263. See Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 275 U.S. 504 (1927) (per curiam).
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trading" a way out of the political box placed over the states and locali-
ties by the doctrine of substantive due process. 264 Blocked from acting
politically in other ways, state citizens were urged by Brandeis to exploit
this way out: the door, cracked open, was to be pushed back all the
way. 2 6 5 Given the constraints in other areas of constitutional law on the
exercise of civic virtue in state political experimentation, one had to use
what was given.
The related themes of Progressive Republicanism, Brandeis' experi-
mental federalism and market-participation immunity from commerce
clause analysis converge in Reeves, Inc. v. Sake.266 In 1919, the Progres-
sive Republicans of South Dakota undertook plans to build a state-
owned cement plant. 2 67 The plant was built and operated for many
years before its policy of supplying in-state customers first was chal-
lenged in federal court under the commerce clause. In 1978, Reeves,
Inc., a Wyoming corporation, unable to obtain the cement it desired,
brought suit to enjoin the cement plant from following the allocative
policies which favored in-state residents. The trial court granted the
requested injunction; the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Speaking through Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court affirmed the
circuit court. It did so by finding that South Dakota's cement-allocation
policy fit squarely within Hughes' market-participant commerce clause
immunity. 268 Further, Justice Blackmun invoked the New State Ice dis-
sent to suggest that federalism considerations reinforced the Court's de-
cision to permit South Dakota to experiment politically, even if the
results of experimentation were not economically optimal.
269
Justice Brandeis would have enjoyed writing the Reeves opinion. That
this opinion, which responds to and expresses the ineluctable political
federalism of American political experience, could be written in 1980,
nearly fifty years after the New Deal, is a good indication that experi-
mental federalism is still alive.
VI. Conclusion
The foregoing inquiry has focused on several aspects of Justice Bran-
deis' experimental federalism. Brandeis' New Slate Ice dissent reflects, at
least in part, the Justice's concern over anticipated constitutional chal-
264. See 5 LETrERS, supra note 11, at 315-16 n.2 (letter to Felix Frankfurter, December 6,
1927).
265. Id. at 315.
266. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
267. Id at 430-31 (1980).
268. Id at 436-40.
269. Id at 441-42.
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lenges to the Wisconsin unemployment insurance legislation. The Jus-
tice's vision of states as socio-economic laboratories can be explained by
his attraction to the political theories of certain American and British
Progressives. More important, his advocacy of federal judicial deference
to state socio-economic legislation was the natural consequence of a vi-
sion of politics which can be located in the Aristotelian tradition of civic
virtue, as opposed to the fundamental rights orientation of classical lib-
eral political theory. Recent Supreme Court decisions, together with the
continued cogency of Justice Brandeis' political theories, indicate that
the doctrine of experimental federalism will continue to be relevant, and
that the New State Ice dissent will gain in importance as a constitutional
precedent.
